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COMMENT
THE PSYCHOLOGIST AS EXPERT WITNESS:
SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM?*
INTRODUCTION
Since Sigmund Freud first introduced his psychoanalytic theory, the
courts have sought the guidance of experts versed in the scientific study of
human behavior.' While the variety of legal issues that may be illuminated
by psychological research continues to expand,2 this Comment will focus
* The author is indebted to Professors Donald N. Bersoff and Alan D. Hornstein
and to Camille A. D'Ascoli for their thoughtful comments and suggestions.
1. See H. MONSTERBERG, ON THE WITNESS STAND: ESSAYS ON PSYCHOLOGY AND
CRIME (1908); S. FREUD, Psycho-Analysis and the Establishment of the Facts in Legal
Proceedings, in 9 THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 103
(std. ed. J. Strachey 1959) (originally published in 1906).
2. The techniques of psychology have been used to illuminate two fundamen-
tally different types of legal issues. The first focuses on the wisdom of general
legislative policies such as the effects of racial segregation, e.g., Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 & n.11 (1954); Appendix to Appellants' Briefs, The Effects
of Segregation and the Consequences of Desegregation: A Social Science Statement,
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), reprinted in 49 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND
ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
41-66 (P. Kurland & G. Casper eds. 1975); the effects of jury size and selection upon
jury decision-making, e.g., Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 232-39 (1978); Williams v.
Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 101 nn. 48 & 49 (1970); M. SAKS, JURY VERDICTS (1977); Goldman,
Maitland & Norton, Psychological Aspects of Jury Performance, 3 J. PSYCHIA. & L.
367 (1975); Mitchell & Byrne, The Defendant's Dilemma: Effects of Juror's Attitudes
and Authoritarianism on Judical Decision, 25 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 123
(1973); Rosenblatt & Rosenblatt, Six-Member Juries in Criminal Cases: Legal and
Psychological Considerations, 47 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 615 (1973); Tate, Hawrish &
Clark, Communication Variables in Jury Selection, 24 J. CoM. 130 (1974); Forum,
Forensic Sociology and Psychology: New Tools for the Criminal Defense Attorney, 12
TULSA L. REV. 274 (1976); Note, An Empirical Study of Six- and Twelve-Member Jury
Decision-Making Processes, 7 MICH. J.L. REF. 712 (1973); the nature of obscenity, e.g.,
United States v. Roth, 237 F.2d 796, 802, 804 & n.9, 811-17 (Appendix) (2d Cir. 1956)
(Frank, J., concurring) (citing Research Center for Human Relations, New York
University, THE IMPACT OF LITERATURE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL DISCUSSION OF SOME
ASSUMPTIONS IN THE CENSORSHIP DEBATE (1954)), aff'd, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Cairns,
Paul & Wishner, Sex Censorship: The Assumptions of Anti-Obscenity Laws and the
Empirical Evidence, 46 MINN. L. REV. 1009 (1962).
The second focuses on a particular factual issue raised at trial that may have a
direct bearing on the outcome of the individual case, such as the effect of peer pressure
and stress upon line-up and eyewitness identification, e.g., United States v. Wade, 388
U.S. 218, 228-39 (1967); United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1152-54 (9th Cir.
1973); Buckhout, Eyewitness Testimony, 231 Sc. AM. 23 (1974); Kubie, Implications
for Legal Procedure of the Fallibility of Human Memory, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 59 (1959);
Levine & Tapp, The Psychology of Criminal Identification: The Gap from Wade to
Kirby, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 1079 (1973); Lezak, Some Psychological Limitations on
Witness Reliability, 20 WAYNE ST. L. REV. 117 (1973); Note, Did Your Eyes Deceive
You? Expert Psychological Testimony on the Unreliability of Eyewitness Identifica-
tion, 29 STAN. L. REV. 969 (1977); and the reliability and validity of employment
testing, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 247 n.13 (1976); Albemarle Paper Co.
v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425-36 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971);
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specifically on the courts' dependence upon psychological evidence and
expert testimony to establish the presence or absence of mental disorders
and the causal connection between such disorders and criminal or tortious
conduct.3 The major premise of this Comment is that the modern trend
toward the more liberal admission of psychological evidence arid expert
testimony 4 does little to assure its probative value.5 The courts' limited
inquiry into the expert's education, training, and experience ignores a far
more fundamental problem - the underlying accuracy vel non of the
psychological techniques upon which psychologists typically rely and the
resultant validity of their diagnoses and opinions concerning the issue of
ultimate fact.
Psychological expert testimony generally involves three levels of
inference, moving from predominantly factual data about a person's
behavior to opinions concerning the issue of ultimate fact.6 The first level of
this hierarchy primarily consists of the psychologist's personal observations
of the party made during the course of a clinical interview. Generally, this
will include essentially objective data about the individual's behavior such
Wilson, A Second Look at Griggs v. Duke Power Company: Ruminations on Job
Testing, Discrimination, and the Role of the Federal Courts, 58 VA. L. REV. 844 (1972);
Note, Employment Testing: The Aftermath of Griggs v. Duke Power Company, 72
COLUM. L. REV. 900 (1972); Note, Beyond the Prima Facie Case in Employment
Discrimination Law: Statistical Proof and Rebuttal, 89 HARV. L. REV. 387 (1975). See
generally Bersoff & Prasse, Applied Psychology and Judicial Decision Making:
Corporal Punishment as a Case in Point, 9 PROF. PSYCHOL. 400 (1978).
3. The term "mental disorder" is used throughout this Comment in a
nonpejorative sense. There appears to be no neutral expression for the type of human
behavior of interest to psychologists testifying in culpable insanity cases that
transcends all theoretical biases. One commentator advocates the use of the term
"crazy behavior" to describe those abnormal thoughts, feelings, and actions
manifested by people for whom society has developed special legal rules. Morse, Crazy
Behavior, Morals, and Science: An Analysis of Mental Health Law, 51 S. CAL. L. REV.
527, 543-54 (1978). For objections to the connotations of "mental illness," "mental
disease," "mental defect," and the entire medical model of human behavior, see T.
SzAsz, The Myth of Mental Illness in IDEOLOGY AND INSANITY: ESSAYS ON THE
PSYCHIATRIC DEHUMANIZATION OF MAN 12 (1970); Morse, supra, at 535 n.14.
4. See pp. 544-54 infra.
5. For more sanguine and largely uncritical views of the role of psychologists as
expert witnesses, see Cooke & Jackson, Competence to Stand Trial: Role of the
Psychologist, 2 PROF. PSYCHOL. 373 (1971); Gaines, The Psychologist as an Expert
Witness in a Personal Injury Case, 39 MARQ. L. REV. 239 (1956); Lassen, The
Psychologist as an Expert Witness in Assessing Mental Disease or Defect, 50 A.B.A.J.
239 (1964); Levine, Psychologist as Expert Witness in "Psychiatric" Questions, 20
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 379 (1971); Louisell, The Psychologist in Today's Legal World, 39
MINN. L. REV. 235 (1955); Nash, Parameters and Distinctiveness of Psychological
Testimony, 5 PROF. PSYCHOL. 239 (1974); Pacht, Kuehn, Bassett & Nash, The Current
Status of the Psychologist as an Expert Witness, 4 PROF. PSYCHOL. 409 (1973); Rice,
The Psychologist as Expert Witness, 16 AM. PSYCHOL. 691 (1961); Comment, The
Psychologist as an Expert Witness, 15 KAN. L. REV. 88 (1966).
6. See generally Cleary, Evidence as a Problem in Communicating, 5 VAND. L.
REV. 277 (1952), reprinted in SELECTED WRITINGS ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE AND
TRIAL 22-37 (W. Fryer ed. 1957).
[VOL. 38
THE PSYCHOLOGIST AS EXPERT WITNESS
as a description of symptoms indicative of a mental disorder (e.g., tics,
stuttering) and the results of any psychological tests that may have been
administered. What distinguishes this level of expert testimony from the
other two is that it rests primarily upon empirical data.
The second level of testimony may be characterized as the diagnostic
component. It represents the point along the testimonial continuum at
which psychologists move from reporting their empirical observations to
synthesizing this information to form a diagnosis that will classify and
perhaps account for the behavior manifested by the individual during the
course of the clinical interview and, in criminal cases, at the time of the
crime. It is on this level that psychologists make judgments, based upon their
skill in that discipline, about whether a person is suffering from a mental
disorder. Whether the diagnosis is offered in terms of a particular diagnostic
label (for example, schizophrenia or schizoid personality) or entails a
lengthy description of the individual's personality, the critical element of
this level of expert testimony is that the diagnosis is empirically based and
derives its meaning from scientifically validated principles about human
behavior. As we shall see, it is this crucial link with the scientific method
that necessitates a reevaluation of the probative value of psychological
evidence and expert testimony in the courtroom.
The third level of testimony elicited from psychological experts concerns
the issue of ultimate fact, the ultimate factual question the jury must resolve.
In the federal system, for example, witnesses, particularly experts, found it
difficult to testify in terms that rigorously discriminated between "facts"
and "opinions," and the courts were unable to distinguish the two without
being unduly restrictive. 7 Consequently, Federal Rule of Evidence 7048 was
designed to permit witnesses to express their opinions on any matter,
including the ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact, as long as it
would be helpful to the jury and not waste time. 9 While this rule may be
justified in certain contexts, this Comment argues that the admission of
psychological opinion testimony should be excluded for two reasons. First,
the scientific bases for such opinions may be unsound. Second, even if such
opinions are well-founded, countervailing factors outweigh their potential
probative value, and psychological expert testimony regarding the ultimate
fact may not be any more helpful to the trier of fact than the thoughtful
opinion of an ordinary layperson.
Before examining the scientific underpinnings of psychological expert
testimony, however, the scope of this inquiry must be outlined. First,
although psychological expert testimony has been received in a variety of
legal contexts,10 this Comment only addresses the admissibility of such
7. See FED. R. EvID. 704 (Advisory Committee's Note).
8. FED. R. EVID. 704 states: "Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference
otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be
decided by the trier of fact."
9. Id. (Advisory Committee's Note). See FED. R. EVID. 403, 701, 702.
10. Expert testimony by psychologists has been offered, albeit unsuccessfully in
some instances, to prove whether there was a causal connection between a criminal
19791
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testimony in the evaluation of either criminal insanity pleas or mental
disorders arising from tortious conduct. Second, because the literature
appraising the scientific accuracy of psychological judgments is limited, any
argument assailing the scientific bases of such opinions necessarily depends
upon a diversity of studies, no one of which is conclusive. Taken collectively,
however, the scientific literature does raise some disturbing questions about
the courts' assumption that psychological techniques and diagnoses are
sufficiently accurate to be deemed probative in a court of law. Although a
major portion of this Comment is devoted to a review of the scientific data,
the methodology of each study has not been independently evaluated. Every
effort has been made, however, to cite the most highly regarded and
authoritative texts and research articles in the field.1 Whenever possible,
act and a mental disorder, e.g., Jenkins v. United States, 307 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1962)
(en banc); People v. Felton, 26 Ill. App. 3d 395, 325 N.E.2d 400 (1975); Saul v. State, 6
Md. App. 540, 252 A.2d 282 (1969); Hogan v. State, 496 S.W.2d 594 (Tex. Crim. App.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 862 (1973); whether a criminal defendant was competent to
stand trial, e.g., Blunt v. United States, 389 F.2d 545 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Colbert v. State,
18 Md. App. 632, 308 A.2d 726 (1973); People v. Crawford, 66 Mich. App. 581, 239
N.W.2d 670 (1976); whether a person committed to a mental institution pursuant to an
acquittal on the grounds of legal insanity may be released, e.g., United States v.
McNeil, 434 F.2d 502 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (per curiam); People v. Pennington, 66 Cal. 2d
508, 426 P.2d 942, 58 Cal. Rptr. 374 (1967) (in bank); People v. Lyles, 186 Colo. 302, 526
P.2d 1332 (1974) (en banc); whether a criminal defendant met the statutory definition
of "defective delinquency," e.g., State v. Williams, 278 Md. 180, 361 A.2d 122 (1976);
whether an accused not raising an insanity defense had the requisite intent or
capacity to commit an alleged criminal act, e.g., State v. Donahue, 141 Conn. 656,109
A.2d 364 (1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 926 (1955); Tremain v. State, 336 So. 2d 705 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Douglas v. United States, 386 A.2d 289 (D.C. Ct. App. 1978);
whether a criminal defendant had a propensity to tell the truth, e.g., Smith v. State,
564 P.2d 1194 (Wyo. 1977); whether a witness in a criminal prosecution was suf-
fering from an underlying emotional problem that would effect the veracity of his
testimony, e.g., United States v. Fields, 3 M.J. 27 (C.M.A. 1977); whether a causal
connection existed between a mental disorder and tortious conduct, e.g., Reese v.
Naylor, 222 So. 2d 487 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969); Spann v. Bees, 23 Md. App. 313, 327
A.2d 801 (1974); City of Austin v. Hoffman, 379 S.W.2d 103 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964);
whether a person was suffering from a mental condition that rendered him
permanently disabled under the terms of an insurance policy, e.g., Hidden v. Mutual
Life Ins. Co., 217 F.2d 818 (4th Cir. 1954), or workmen's compensation act, e.g., Bilbrey
v. Industrial Comm'n, 27 Ariz. App. 473, 556 P.2d 27 (1976); Busby v. Martin, 166 So.
2d 660 (La. Ct. App. 1964); whether a person's mental condition was such that a
petition for civil commitment should be granted, e.g., In re Wellington, 34 Ill. App. 3d
515, 340 N.E.2d 31 (1975); whether a person civilly committed should be "restored to
capacity," e.g., In re Masters, 216 Minn. 553, 13 N.W.2d 487 (1944); whether
eyewitness testimony was reliable, e.g., United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148 (9th
Cir. 1973); United States v. Collins, 395 F. Supp. 629 (M.D. Pa. 1975); People v.
Guzman, 47 Cal. App. 3d 380, 121 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1975); and whether employment
qualification tests were reliable and valid, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229
(1976); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424 (1971). See note 2 supra.
11. Most, if not all, of the scientific articles cited in this Comment appear in
journals refereed and edited by psychologists prominent in their field who have
presumably reviewed the methodology of each study.
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reviews of the psychological literature in a particular area have been relied
upon for support. The scientific studies cited below are not intended to
convince the reader that such psychological judgments are unequivocally
inaccurate but to demonstrate that researchers, publishing in psychology's
most prestigious professional journals, have expressed a less than sanguine
view about the accuracy of the techniques underlying psychological expert
testimony. The doubts they raise not only mandate a reassessment of
psychological expert testimony's probative value in the cburtroom but
should also stimulate researchers to supplement the limited, but generally
negative, data currently available. Third, many of the criticisms regarding
the scientific bases of psychological expert testimony are directly applicable
to the testimony of psychiatrists. 12 Finally, this critique of psychological
evidence and expert testimony is strictly limited to its role in a court of law.
The premise of this Comment is that the degree of accuracy the courts
should require psychologists to demonstrate is largely controlled by factors
ordinarily not applicable in nonlegal contexts. The admissibility of scientific
evidence in the courtroom is dictated not only by a showing of minimal
probativeness but also by whether its probative value outweighs the various
evidentiary counterweights 13 - an extra layer of analysis that consumers of
psychological services do not need to consider before embracing the
therapeutic and informational benefits of the psychological sciences.
Although the scientific bases of psychology may be adequate to sustain its
validity as a social science, it is argued that in a legal context the courts
should impose on psychology qua science the same standards for probative
value that it demands of every other scientific process or technique. In light
of this legal standard for admissibility, psychology arguably has not
advanced to the stage where it can reliably aid the trier of fact in its search
for truth and still surmount the evidentiary. counterweights.
The nature of psychological evidence and expert testimony will be
examined in four parts. First, the modern standard for the admissibility of
such expert testimony will be reviewed. Next, the fundamental evidentiary
problems scientific evidence and opinion testimony raise for the courts will
12. See generally J. ZISKIN, COPING WITH PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL
TESTIMONY (2d ed. 1975 & Supp. 1977); Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the
Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REv. 693
(1974). These commentators conclude that psychiatric expert testimony should be
severely curtailed if not eliminated altogether. With regard to civil commitment
proceedings, Ennis and Litwack observed: "[T]here is no evidence that psychiatric
opinions and terminology clarify rather than confuse the issues in a civil commitment
proceeding, and there is good reason to believe that judges and juries could function
quite adequately in a civil commitment proceeding without 'expert' opinion
testimony." Ennis & Litwack, supra, at 696. Given that psychologists attempt to
validate their observations empirically through the use of various assessment
techniques, perhaps their expert testimony should be preferred by the courts over that
offered by psychiatrists who do not rely upon such objective measures.
13. E.g., FED. R. EvID. 403. Rule 403 states: "Although relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of
undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."
19791
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be discussed. Third, the underlying scientific bases and accuracy of
psychological expert testimony will be analyzed. Finally, the probative
value of such testimony will be evaluated in light of the various evidentiary
counterweights.
PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPERT TESTIMONY IN THE COURTROOM
Psychologists in the United States have served as expert witnesses since
at least the early 1920's; 14 however, it was not until 1940 that the issue of the
admissibility of psychological expert testimony was directly addressed by a
state supreme court. 15 Three decisions, People v. Hawthorne,6 Hidden v.
14. E.g., Dobbs v. State, 191 Ark. 236, 85 S.W.2d 694 (1935); Abbott v. State, 113
Neb. 517, 204 N.W. 74 (1925); State v. Driver, 88 W. Va. 479, 107 S.E. 189 (1921). In
Dobbs, the Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the trial court's refusal to permit a
professor of psychology to answer a hypothetical question regarding a criminal
defendant's sanity because the psychologist had not been properly qualified as an
expert. The authority relied upon by the Dobbs court strongly suggests that the
medical model of mental disorders was already firmly entrenched by 1935. See Odom
v. State, 174 Ala. 4, 7, 56 So. 913, 914 (1911) ("As a general rule, only medical men -
that is, persons licensed by law to practice the profession of medicine - can testify as
experts on the question of insanity; and the propriety of this general limitation is too
patent to permit discussion."); note 52 infra.
In Abbott, a psychologist was prevented from expressing an opinion in a
sodomy case about the effect of parental suggestion on the imagination of a child
between the ages of five and seven years. In Driver, the chief psychologist of a state
bureau of juvenile research qualified as an expert in juvenile delinquency, but the
West Virginia Supreme Court sustained the trial court's refusal to permit him to
impeach a twelve-year-old attempted rape victim's testimony on the basis that the girl
was a "moron." The court observed: "It is yet to be demonstrated that psychological
and medical tests are practical, and will detect the lie on the witness stand." 88 W. Va.
at 488, 107 S.E. at 193.
15. See note 16 infra.
16. 293 Mich. 15, 291 N.W. 205 (1940); accord, People v. Crawford, 66 Mich. App.
581, 239 N.W.2d 670 (1976) (extended Hawthorne to issue of competency to stand trial).
In Hawthorne, a criminal defendant was charged with manslaughter and interposed
an insanity defense. On appeal he contended, inter alia, that the trial court's refusal
to qualify a psychologist as an expert witness was in error. Although all eight
members of the Michigan Supreme Court agreed that the conviction should be
affirmed, the justices split over whether a psychologist may qualify as an expert on
insanity. Five members of the court concurred that a general medical training was not
the sine qua non of an expert's competency to testify about criminal insanity. 293
Mich. at 22-26, 291 N.W. at 208-09. They argued that the proper standard for
determining expertise was not the acquisition of a particular scientific degree but the
extent of the witness' knowledge. Id. at 24-25, 291 N.W. at 209. The remaining three
justices denied the admissibility of testimony by psychological expert witnesses on
the grounds that only persons with medical training could properly present such
evidence. Id. at 20, 291 N.W. at 207. Furthermore, they argued that insanity was a
"disease" within the realm of medical science. The minority flatly stated: "Insanity,
however, is held to be a disease ... and, therefore, comes within the realm of medical
science, which comprises the study and treatment of disease. Only physicians can
qualify to answer hypothetical questions as experts in such science." Id. at 20, 291
N.W. at 207 (citation omitted); see note 52 infra.
Hawthorne presents the earliest reported standard for the admission of
psychological expert testimony, and it is the first of a trilogy of authorities frequently
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Mutual Life Insurance Company,17 and Jenkins v. United States,'8 form the
basis of modern legal authority for the proposition that psychologists who
are qualified in terms of their education and experience may freely offer an
opinion about the presence or absence of mental disorders and their causal
cited by the courts of other jurisdictions for the proposition that mental disorders are
not the exclusive province of physicians and that for evidentiary purposes the
testimony of a properly qualified psychologist should be freely admitted. E.g., Jenkins
v. United States, 307 F.2d 637, 643 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (en banc) (dictum); People v.
Davis, 62 Cal. 2d 791, 800, 402 P.2d 142, 148, 44 Cal. Rptr. 454, 460 (1965) (in bank);
Watson v. State, 161 Tex. Crim. 5, 8, 273 S.W.2d 879, 882 (1954).
17. 217 F.2d 818 (4th Cir. 1954). Hidden applied the rationale of Hawthorne to
expert testimony by psychologists in civil actions. The plaintiff sought indemnity
under the total and permanent disability clauses of an insurance contract, claiming
that a "disabling nervous condition" prevented him from engaging in any gainful
occupation. Id. at 819. Without citing any precedents, the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit held that a clinical psychologist with a doctoral degree was qualified
as an expert by virtue of his education and experience and that he should have been
permitted to express his opinion about the present mental condition of the insured as
well as his mental condition three years earlier when the insurance policy was in
effect. Id. at 821.
18. 307 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (en banc). In Jenkins, the preeminent authority
of the trilogy, the defendant raised an insanity defense to the charges of
housebreaking with intent to commit assault, assault with intent to rape, and assault
with a dangerous weapon. Id. at 639. On appeal, the defendant alleged, inter alia, that
the trial judge erred in instructing the jury to disregard the testimony of the three
defense psychologists on the ground that they were not competent to give a medical
opinion on whether the accused was suffering from a mental disease or defect when
he committed the alleged crimes. Id. at 639, 642-43. Although Jenkins did not object to
this jury instruction at trial, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
agreed to examine this issue because it was likely to arise upon retrial. Id. at 643. A
new trial was ordered because of the trial judge's exclusion of a psychiatrist's revised
diagnosis based, in part, upon psychological test reports that were not in evidence and
administered thirteen months after his last personal examination of the defendant.
Id. at 640-41.
Writing for the majority, Judge Bazelon sharply criticized the trial judge's
automatic exclusion of psychological expert testimony predicated on the witnesses'
lack of medical training. Advocating a less dogmatic rule, he emphasized that the
standard of admissibility for such testimony must be evaluated in terms of its
probative value to the trier of fact, observing:
We hold only that the lack of a medical degree, and the lesser degree of
responsibility for patient care which mental hospitals usually assign to
psychologists, are not automatic disqualifications. Where relevant, these
matters may be shown to affect the weight of their testimony, even though it
be admitted in evidence. The critical factor in respect to admissibility is the
actual experience of the witness and the probable probative value of his
opinion.
Id. at 646 (dictum) (emphasis added). Earlier in his opinion, Judge Bazelon noted:
The determination of a psychologist's competence to render an expert opinion
based on his findings as to the presence or absence of mental disease or defect
must depend upon the nature and extent of his knowledge. It does not depend
upon his claim to the title "psychologist." . . . When completion of [graduate]
training is followed by actual experience in the treatment and diagnosis of
1979]
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connection with criminal or tortious conduct. 19 A majority of those
jurisdictions that have discussed the admissibility of such testimony hold
that psychologists and psychiatrists should be treated equally.20 To date
psychological expert testimony has been accepted in either a criminal or
civil context by four of the eleven federal circuits
2 1 
and seventeen states. 22
Maryland, in the face of a judicial trend to restrict such testimony there,
disease in association with psychiatrists or neurologists, the opinion of the
psychologist may properly be received in evidence.
Id. at 645 (dictum) (footnotes omitted). The Jenkins court rejected the rigid medical-
nonmedical distinction applied by the trial judge in favor of a standard designed to
ensure the probativeness of the testimony. See note 52 infra.
Noting that not every psychologist may possess the requisite degree of skill
and training required to diagnose mental conditions and to relate these disorders to
past behavior, the court in Jenkins focused on the clinical psychologist with a
doctoral degree as one of the most likely persons in the field to qualify as an expert
witness. Id. at 644-45. The court proposed several factors a trial judge might consider
in evaluating the competence of a psychologist to render an expert opinion: graduate
training in programs approved by the American Psychological Association, clinical
experience in association with psychiatrists or neurologists, and certification by the
American Board of Examiners in Professional Psychology. Id. at 645.
19. See note 8 supra.
20. See Appendix infra. The courts in those jurisdictions not mentioned here have
probably accepted psychological expert witnesses without question because their
"expert" status has been legitimated by society through licensure. See pp. 563-64
infra.
21. Fourth, Fifth, Seventh and District of Columbia Circuits. See Appendix infra.
A similar rule prevails in at least one district of the Third Circuit as well. United
States v. Tesfa, 404 F. Supp. 1259, 1273-74 (E.D. Pa. 1975); United States v. Green, 373
F. Supp. 149, 157-58 (E.D. Pa. 1974). The Court of Military Appeals also appears to
have adopted this standard. Cf. United States v. Fields, 3 M.J. 27, 28-29 (C.M.A. 1977)
(counseling psychologist with M.A. degree specializing in field of alcohol and drug
abuse rehabilitation properly held not qualified to testify regarding underlying
emotional problem of Government's witness for purposes of impeaching his credibility
in light of expert's education and experience).
22. California, Colorado, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, New
Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Texas, Virginia, Wisconsin. See Appendix infra. Psychologists have attempted to
testify about issues beyond the scope of this Comment in at least four other
jurisdictions with varying success. Cf. Douglas v. United States, 386 A.2d 289, 295-96
(D.C. Ct. App. 1978) (trial court properly excluded testimony by psychologist
concerning defendant's incapacity to commit type of sexual offenses with which he
was charged); In re Masters, 216 Minn. 553, 559-60, 13 N.W.2d 487, 491 (1944) (dictum)
(educational psychologist with master's degree permitted to testify without objection
about results of intelligence tests administered to petitioner during restoration to
capacity hearing of allegedly feeble-minded person); State v. Deyo, 358 S.W.2d 816,
825-26 (Mo. 1962) (per curiam) (dictum) (psychologists permitted to testify without
objection about results of intelligence tests administered to accused for purposes of
showing that her statements and confession were not voluntary due to feeble-
mindedness); State v. Huff, 14 N.J. 240, 250, 102 A.2d 8, 13 (1954) (dictum) (qualified
expert psychologist's testimony regarding mental age and capacity of accused
properly excluded on ground that it sought to compare the defendant's mental ability
with that of infant rather than ultimate issue of whether his conduct conformed with
legal standard for insanity).
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adopted legislation to reverse it.23 Four states24 admit psychological expert
testimony but limit its scope, and none appears to exclude such testimony
entirely.2
5
The Arizona Court of Appeals has addressed the issue of the
admissibility of psychological expert testimony only in the context of
workmen's compensation actions. In Bilbrey v. Industrial Commission,26 the
court concluded that only expert medical testimony may be offered to
establish the causal link between physical injuries and mental disabilities.2 7
By framing the question in terms of whether a licensed clinical psychologist
can present the required medical testimony, it was able to reject the
proffered testimony on the basis of the Arizona medical practice statute.28 In
a later workmen's compensation case, Kucko v. Industrial Commission,29
the court of appeals qualified the Bilbrey limitation on psychological expert
testimony, noting that it did not exclude the testimony of qualified
psychologists about the present mental capacity and ability of their
clients. 0 Between the Bilbrey and Kucko decisions, however, the Arizona
legislature amended the psychologist certification statute 1 to permit
psychologists to diagnose, treat, and correct human conditions ordinarily
within the scope of their practice, 32 responding, perhaps, to the strict
prohibition set forth in Bilbrey. The Kucko court, however, made no
23. See note 349 infra. A similar, but far less explicit, effort to alter judicial
restrictions on psychological expert testimony was undertaken by the Arizona
legislature but with uncertain results. See text accompanying notes 31 to 33 & 312
infra.
24. Arizona, Florida, Illinois, Louisiana. See Appendix infra.
25. North Carolina may fall into this category; however, there are no reported
decisions directly on point regarding the admissibility of psychological expert
testimony. Cf. State v. Peterson, 24 N.C. App. 404, 407-08, 210 S.E.2d 883, 885-86
(1975) (no abuse of discretion in excluding opinion of clinical psychologist with
doctoral degree about whether accused was unconscious in that he was experiencing
dissociative reaction at time of crime; court noted general lack of agreement over
qualification of nonmedical psychologist to testify about mental condition or
competency).
26. 27 Ariz. App. 473, 556 P.2d 27 (1976).
27. The petitioner in Bilbrey had sustained a moderately severe head injury while
at work and sought the continuance of workmen's compensation benefits on the
ground that he was emotionally disabled as a result of the accident. Id. at 473, 556
P.2d at 27.
28. See note 52 infra.
29. 116 Ariz. 530, 570 P.2d 217 (1977).
30. The petitioner in Kucko had injured his back and had been declared partially
disabled. He sought total disability compensation based upon the presence of a
disabling mental condition, allegedly causally related to the accident, in addition to
his physical impairment. Id. at 531, 570 P.2d at 218.
31. ARiz. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2061 to -2087 (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1979).
32. ARiz. REV. STAT. § 32-2084 (Cum. Supp. 1979) provides:
No provision of this chapter shall authorize any person to engage in any
manner in the practice of medicine as defined by the laws of this state, except
that any person certified by the provisions of this chapter shall be permitted
to diagnose, treat and correct human conditions ordinarily within the scope of
the practice of a psychologist.
See 1977 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 145, at 827.
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reference to the revised statute even though the issue raised in that case was
directly on point - whether the establishment of a causal link between a
past physical injury and a present mental disorder would be considered
"ordinarily within the scope of the practice of a psychologist. '33
In Reese v. Naylor,34 the Florida District Court of Appeals noted that
there was no error in admitting the testimony of a qualified clinical
psychologist concerning the diagnosis of a person's mental condition based
on the use of the devices and techniques ordinarily utilized by such
practitioners. 35 In this personal injury action arising from an automobile
accident, the clinical psychologist testified about the administration of
various psychological tests and offered his diagnosis. The defense objected
on the ground that the diagnosis of a patient's mental condition was not
within the scope of psychological practice as defined by statute and instead
was clearly within the medical practice statute. The Reese court noted that
for the purposes of a negligence action there may be a difference between the
qualifications needed by an expert witness in the mental health field to
testify about the causal relationship between a trauma and a mental
condition and those needed to offer evidence regarding the nature or extent
of such a mental condition.38 The court never reached this issue, however,
because it was not properly preserved at trial.3 7
The prevailing rule in Illinois appears to be that qualified psychologists
may offer an opinion concerning the mental condition of a person based
solely upon psychological tests but only if those tests are administered at the
request of a psychiatrist who will, in turn, incorporate the test results into
his or her own diagnosis and expert testimony. The precise contours of this
position, however, have not yet been delineated by the Illinois Supreme
Court. In People v. Noble,38 the supreme court discussed, but did not resolve,
33. ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 32-2084 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
34. 222 So. 2d 487 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969) (dictum).
35. Id. at 490.
36. Id.
37. Cf. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. v. Hill, 250 So.2d 311, 314-15 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1971) (psychologist who was expert in human perception and environmental factors
that might adversely affect perception was qualified to offer opinion about whether
average driver would have seen train at railroad crossing in time to have avoided
collision; significance and reaction of human beings to deceptive environmental
factors might reasonably be considered beyond common knowledge of jurors and thus
proper subject matter for expert opinion). But cf. Lamazares v. Valdez, 353 So. 2d
1257, 1258 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (admission of expert psychological testimony that
defendant was untruthful and liable to make mistake or misjudgment in his driving
ability to react to accident circumstances constituted reversible error because clear
invasion of province of jury); Termain v. State, 336 So. 2d 705, 706-07 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1976) (testimony of psychologist in support of entrapment defense that
defendant was dependent on others and lacked will power was properly rejected by
trial court because accused did not plead insanity and it would only confuse jury and
create immaterial issues).
38. 42 Ill. 2d 425, 248 N.E.2d 96 (1969) (dictum). In Noble, the defendant was
charged with murder and offered the expert testimony of a psychiatrist and a
psychologist in support of his insanity defense.
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the question whether psychologists are qualified to diagnose the existence
and nature of mental disease and to determine whether there is a causal
relationship between such disease and criminal behavior.39 Although the
trend in other jurisdictions to permit such testimony was noted by the court,
it did not indicate whether Illinois should follow suit because the facts did
not compel resolution of that issue. The Illinois Court of Appeals has put its
own gloss on the Noble court's dictum by requiring that a foundation of
psychiatric evidence be laid before testimony by psychologists, regardless of
their qualifications, may be deemed relevant.40 In People v. Manning,41 the
court of appeals noted that it had interpreted Noble to stand for two
propositions: first, a psychologist's testimony about the tests administered
and the results thereof is irrelevant unless it forms the basis for a
psychiatrist's opinion of the defendant's sanity, 42 and second, the psycholo-
gist must possess the requisite education and experience - at least a
doctoral degree and two years experience. 43 The Manning court observed
that the trial judge's refusal to permit a psychologist - who possessed a
master's degree in psychology and who had worked for about five years as a
court psychologist - to testify as an expert witness regarding the results of
intelligence tests she administered to a criminal defendant charged with
armed robbery was not in error.44 Despite the court's emphasis on the
psychologist's limited qualifications, it noted that upon retrial she could
testify about the intelligence tests she administered "if it assists proper
psychiatric evidence of defendant's sanity."'4 Even if a proper psychiatric
foundation is laid, it appears that qualified psychologists in Illinois may not
testify about the ultimate issue of a criminal defendant's sanity.46
39. Id. at 434, 428 N.E.2d at 101. The accused had been referred to the
psychologist by the psychiatrist for psychological testing and evaluation. At trial, the
court rejected the offer of proof involving the testimony of the psychologist and
excluded his description of the psychological tests administered, the procedure used,
and his opinion based upon results of these tests. The psychiatrist was not permitted
to include in his own testimony any consideration of the results of the psychological
testing in order to prevent him from doing indirectly what the psychologist could not
do directly.
40. People v. Manning, 61 Ill. App. 3d 558, 378 N.E.2d 227 (1978) (dictum).
41. Id.
42. Accord, People v. Gilliam, 16 Ill. App. 3d 659, 663-64, 306 N.E.2d 352, 355-56
(1974); People v. McBride, 130 Ill. App. 2d 201, 204-06, 264 N.E.2d 446, 448-49 (1970).
43. 61 111. App. 3d at 564, 378 N.E.2d at 232 (dictum). Cf. In re Wellington, 34 Ill.
App. 3d 515, 516-21, 340 N.E.2d 31, 33-35 (1975) (mental health specialist with
bachelor's degree and forty hours of graduate work in clinical and experimental
psychology improperly held qualified by trial court to give testimony on issue of
mental competency in civil commitment proceeding; he was not qualified in terms of
his education and experience, nor did he meet psychologist licensing requirements).
44. 61 Ill. App. 3d at 564, 378 N.E.2d at 233.
45. Id., 378 N.E.2d at 233. Quaere: Whether the Manning court's second
proposition - that a psychologist must present adequate credentials - has any real
bearing on the admissibility of such expert testimony whenever it is offered as an
adjunct to "proper psychiatric evidence"?
46. See People v. Morthole, 51 Ill. App. 3d 919, 927-28, 366 N.E.2d 606, 612 (1977)
(dictum). Cf. People v. Felton, 26 Ill. App. 3d 395, 399-400, 325 N.E.2d 400, 403-04
(1975) (not reversible error to exclude such testimony).
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The limitations on psychological expert testimony in Louisiana are
unclear. In State v. Alexander,47 the Louisiana Supreme Court laconically
noted that an unlicensed practicing psychologist could not testify as an
expert regarding the sanity of the defendant at the time of the offense
because he "possessed no qualification as a psychiatrist," 48 implying that
only medically trained experts may offer such opinions.
49
In criminal actions, psychological expert testimony is generally offered
to support or rebut pleas of insanity to felony charges. Typically,
psychologists are permitted to testify about the nature of the tests they
administer to defendants, to present analyses of the test data, and to offer
diagnoses based upon that information. The state survey revealed that most
of the controversy over admissibility concerned whether psychologists, once
properly qualified, should have been permitted to express an opinion about
the ultimate issue of fact. Generally, the restrictive approach of Arizona,
Florida, Illinois, and Louisiana, insofar as it attempts to separate empirical
observations from opinions regarding the issue of ultimate fact, is difficult
to apply consistently. As the Advisory Committee noted with regard to
Federal Rule of Evidence 704, 50 there are no bright line tests for
distinguishing the limits of such opinion testimony, especially in light of the
prominent role subjective interpretation plays in the evaluation of psycho-
logical test results and diagnoses. 51 Another, albeit less persuasive,
argument for limiting psychological expert testimony focuses on whether
medical training is required to enable a witness to offer an opinion on
whether a causal connection exists between a defendant's present or past
mental condition and his or her criminal conduct and, if so, whether that
condition is sufficient to excuse criminal responsibility based upon the legal
standard for insanity.52 That psychologists do not possess a medical degree,
however, does not resolve the more fundamental issue - whether the
47. 252 La. 564, 211 So. 2d 650 (1968).
48. Id. at 574, 211 So. 2d at 654.
49. But see Busby v. Martin, 166 So.2d 660, 662-63 (La. Ct. App. 196 4) (clinical
psychologist with doctoral degree who taught at university medical school properly
permitted to offer opinion testimony in workmen's compensation case that petitioner
could not return to job for psychological reasons possibly aggravated by the accident;
psychologist deemed "eminently qualified" as expert even though he did not possess
M.D. degree).
50. FED. R. EVID. 704 (Advisory Committee's Note). See text accompanying notes
7 to 9 supra.
51. See pp. 562-89 infra.
52. E.g., Saul v. State, 6 Md. App. 540, 252 A.2d 282 (1969); State v. Robertson, 108
R.I. 656, 278 A.2d 842 (1971), aff'g result on remand, 111 R.I. 399, 303 A.2d 360 (1973).
To demonstrate that the diagnosis of mental disorders should remain the exclusive
province of physicians, the party opposing the admissibility of psychological expert
testimony will typically argue that medical doctors are the only persons licensed by
the state to practice medicine, and that the practice of medicine is generally defined
by the state licensing statute to include the diagnosis and treatment of any physical
or mental disease or disorder. E.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. § 32-1401(9) (1976); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 43, § 119(f) (Cum. Supp. 1979); TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4510-4510a
(Vernon 1976). Consequently, the treatment of mental disorders is a part of medical
practice. Opponents argue further that although the specific terminology used to
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probative value of the evidence offered by psychologists is appreciably
influenced by such a medical-nonmedical distinction.
describe mental disorders may be shared by both psychiatrists and psychologists, it is
used to denote a medical, not psychological, condition. Thus, psychologists who
testify using such terminology are describing a mental disorder and are thereby
offering a medical diagnosis and engaging in the practice of medicine. Because
psychologists are not licensed by the state to practice medicine - the diagnosis and
treatment of any physical or mental disease or disorder, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 43,
§ 639 (1971); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4512c, § 3 (Vernon 1976); contra ARiz.
REV. STAT. § 32-2084 (Cum. Supp. 1979) ("except that any person certified by the
provisions of this chapter shall be permitted to diagnose, treat and correct human
conditions ordinarily within the scope of the practice of a psychologist") - they are
offering expert testimony about a matter outside the purview of their profession as
defined by law. This medical-nonmedical distinction only distracts the courts from the
fundamental issue, whether the information being conveyed to the trier of fact by
psychological or psychiatric experts is scientifically accurate.
Two misconceptions underlie this argument. First, it ignores the arbitrariness
of our idiomatic expressions for mental disorders. At least one commentator has
argued that diseases without demonstrable organic components are incompatible with
the traditional medical concept of disease - the causation of the symptomology may
be objectively determined. T. SzAsz, supra note 3, at 12-17. According to Szasz'
theory, the characterization of mental disorders as "illnesses" or "diseases" merely
obscures the fact that they are not a typical part of medical practice. Our perception of
them as "illnesses" is not empirically grounded but derived with reference to social
values that may vacillate radically. Second, the fact that psychiatrists and
psychologists share the same nomenclature does not necessarily imply that it is the
language of medical diagnosis. While each profession may use the same terms to
describe mental disorders, the theoretical conceptions they connote may be quite
different. See pp. 576-82 infra.
Adherence to the medical-nonmedical distinction, as the Hawthorne and
Jenkins courts clearly recognized, does not necessarily promote the fundamental
purpose of expert testimony, to aid the trier of fact in its search for truth. The
prevalence of the medical training argument to exclude psychological expert
testimony may be attributed, in part, to the long-standing professional rivalry
existing between psychologists and their medical counterparts, psychiatrists. See
Casimere v. Herman, 28 Wis. 2d 437, 443, 137 N.W.2d 73, 76 (1965). See generally
Grinker, Albee, Schachter, Garmezy, Thrasher & Mensh, Emerging Conceptions of
Mental Illness and Models of Treatment, 2 PROF. PSYCHOL. 129 (1971). The tension
between these two disciplines was evident in the amicus curiae briefs submitted to the
Jenkins court by their respective professional organizations, the American Psycholog-
ical Association and the American Psychiatric Association. The former argued that
psychology was an established science and learned profession with its own methods
of diagnosing mental diseases or defects. It urged that this field should not be
considered the exclusive province of scientists with medical training. Amicus brief for
American Psychological Association, Jenkins v. United States, 307 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir.
1962) (en banc), reprinted in READINGS IN LAW AND PSYCHIATRY 155-59 (rev. ed. R.
Allen, E. Ferster & J. Rubin 1975) [hereinafter cited as READINGS]. See generally Hoch
& Darley, A Case At. Law, 17 Am. PSYCHOL. 623 (1962).
In opposition, the American Psychiatric Association stressed that the
treatment of illnesses, whatever their etiology, had traditionally been a medical
concern and that the diagnosis and treatment of mental illnesses should be no
exception. Amicus brief for American Psychiatric Association, Jenkins v.* United
States, 307 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (en banc), reprinted in READINGS, supra, at
159-61. The American Psychiatric Association's position was unequivocal: The
psychologist was, at best, professionally subservient to the psychiatrist. The
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Civil actions involving psychological experts deal primarily with
tortious conduct. Typically, they are asked to testify about the results of
Association's brief quoted the text of a 1954 resolution entitled Resolution on the
Relationship of Psychotherapy to Medicine. It was approved by the Board of Trustees
of the American Medical Association, the Council of the American Psychiatric
Association, and the Executive Council of the American Psychoanalytic Association,
three medically oriented organizations. The following excerpt from that resolution
reflects the tenor of the American Psychiatric Association's attitude toward
psychologists in 1962.
Psychotherapy is a form of medical treatment and does not form the basis for
a separate profession.
Other professional groups such as psychologists . . . , of course, use
psychological understanding in carrying out their professional functions.
Members of these professional groups are not thereby practicing medicine.
The application of psychological methods to the treatment of illness is a
medical function. Any physician may utilize the skills of others in his
professional work, but he remains responsible legally and morally, for the
diagnosis and for the treatment of his patient.
The medical profession fully endorses the appropriate utilization of the
skills of psychologists .... It further recognizes that these professions are
entirely independent and autonomous when medical questions are not
involved; but when members of these professions contribute to the diagnosis
and treatment of illness, their professional contributions must be co-ordinated
under medical responsibility.
American Medical Association, American Psychiatric Association & American
Psychoanalytic Association, Resolution on the Relationship of Psychotherapy to
Medicine (1954) (emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as 1954 Resolution], quoted in
Amicus brief for American Psychiatric Association, Jenkins v. United States, 307
F.2d 637, 648 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (en banc) (Burger, J., concurring), reprinted in
READINGS, supra, at 160.
Notably, neither association discussed in its amicus brief how the scientific
expertise of professional psychologists or psychiatrists could be translated into
trustworthy opinions about the applicability of a particular legal standard. Their lack
of attention to this critical detail may be attributed, in part, to confusion over the
meaning of "mental disease or defect" in the criminal insanity statute invoked by the
defendant in Jenkins. See W. LAFAVE & A. ScoT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 38,
at 291-92 (1972). While the court did not specify the particular statute in question, the
Durham "product" test was the standard in effect at that time. D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 24-301 (1962). Underlying this phrase are two distinct concepts. One is the scientific
notion of mental disorder, the presence or absence of which may be empirically
demonstrated. The other derives its significance from the realm of social policy - it is
the legal criterion that must be fulfilled to the satisfaction of the trier of fact before
criminal behavior may be exculpated. The potentially prejudicial effects of permitting
psychological expert testimony concerning the former concept to be generalized to the
latter issue are addressed below. See pp. 593-98 infra. The point is that the
professional associations' preoccupation with the medical-nonmedical debate ob-
scured these two fundamental elements of psychological expert testimony.
Then Circuit Judge Burger, concurring in Jenkins, sharply criticized the
majority for misconstruing the issue raised by the case. While Judge Bazelon focused
on the probable probative value of the expert testimony rather than the nature of the
expert's degree, see note 18 supra, Judge Burger framed the issue as a "question of a
psychologist's competence to make a diagnosis of mental disease." 307 F.2d at 649
(Burger, J., concurring) (emphasis in original). His reliance upon the medical model of
mental disorders was evidently a foregone conclusion. Citing the 1954 resolution
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psychological tests administered to plaintiffs injured in accidents and to
offer a diagnosis regarding the injured party's mental status. As in the
criminal context, the primary objection to the admissibility of such expert
testimony concerns whether a psychologist can express an opinion about the
causal connection between the accident, the injury, and the present mental
condition of the plaintiff. Objections are typically founded on the argument
that such judgments require medical expertise. 53 An overwhelming majority
of those jurisdictions that have addressed this issue have rejected the
medical-nonmedical distinction in favor of the "probable probative value"
rationale used in Hawthorne and Jenkins.
The qualifications of the psychological expert witness usually include
possession of a doctoral degree in clinical psychology, a license by the
quoted in the American Psychiatric Association's brief, which he suggested was
"plainly entitled to great weight," 307 F.2d at 648, he concluded:
[I]t would be proper, if a clinical psychologist is found qualified to testify as to
the presence or absence of a mental disease and does so in opposition to a
psychiatrist, to tell the jury they could take into account the difference in the
education, training and experience of psychologists and psychiatrists and the
absence of medical training in the former.
Id. at 651 (emphasis added). Given Judge Burger's characterization of the evidence as
fundamentally medical, his suggested jury instruction might well nullify whatever
probative value a nonmedical clinical psychologist's testimony might have for the
trier of fact. Implicit in his argument is the position that testimony of this nature
would constitute a medical opinion on a mental disease because "'the application of
psychological methods to the treatment of illness is a medical function."' Id. at 648
n.1 (quoting 1954 Resolution, supra) (emphasis added by Burger, J., concurring).
The dissenting opinion in Jenkins was even more emphatic in its opposition
to psychological expert testimony: "[I]t must be concluded beyond doubt that the
existence of a mental disease or defect is, first and foremost, a medical problem." Id.
at 651 (Bastian, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). See, e.g., People v. Gilliam, 16
Ill. App. 3d 659, 306 N.E.2d 353 (1974); State v. Tull, 240 Md. 49, 212 A.2d 729 (1965);
Colbert v. State, 18 Md. App. 632, 308 A.2d 726 (1973); Saul v. State, 6 Md. App. 540,
252 A.2d 282 (1969). The dissent's rationale, however, is bewildering. It concluded that
because the issue of mental illness was so nebulous and uncertain even to those of the
medical profession who were experienced and trained in its diagnosis and treatment,
it is sheer folly ... to attribute to a lay psychologist, who admittedly is not a
doctor of medicine, such diagnostic acuity as to entitle him to wear in a
criminal courtroom the badge of an expert witness with respect to the
existence of that elusive medical condition known as mental disease or defect.
307 F.2d at 651-52 (emphasis in original). The dissent ignored the equally plausible
conclusion that expert testimony regarding such "elusive medical conditions" by both
psychologists and psychiatrists ought to be excluded.
Despite the recognition in Jenkins of psychological expert testimony, its
education and experience standard does not effectively ensure that psychological
evidence and expert testimony will be even minimally probative because the scientific
accuracy of psychological techniques and the diagnoses based thereon need not be
demonstrated prior to qualifying the psychological expert. A recent review of the
scientific literature seriously challenges the Jenkins court's basic assumption that the
scientific basis of psychological expert testimony makes it reasonably accurate for
evidentiary purposes. See pp. 562-89 infra.
53. E.g., Bilbrey v. Industrial Comm'n, 27 Ariz. App. 473, 556 P.2d 27 (1976);
Reese v. Naylor, 222 So. 2d 487 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969). See note 52 supra.
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state to practice psychology, teaching experience at the college or graduate
school level, and engagement in private practice or employment by a state
mental institution or private clinic. 54 Other relevant factors include the
expert's participation in a clinical internship, membership in the American
Psychological Association, diplomate status with the American Board of
Examiners in Professional Psychology, and publication of articles in
professional journals.5 5
Of the relatively few appellate decisions that have mentioned some or
all of the non-projective psychological tests 6 administered to either criminal
defendants or plaintiffs in tort actions, most frequently noted have been
intelligence tests5 and the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory.
58
In the projective test59 category, the Rorschach inkblot6° and the Thematic
Apperception Test 6' appear relatively common.
It is surprisingly rare for courts to evaluate the underlying accuracy of
the psychological evidence being offered to the trier of fact.62 They have
largely ignored the fundamental issue explored in this Comment, the
scientific bases of the psychological tests administered and the diagnoses
based thereon. The following section examines the admissibility of scientific
evidence in general and the application of these principles to psychological
evidence and expert testimony in particular in order to assure that it is
minimally probative and that its probative value is not outweighed by the
evidentiary counterweights.
PSYCHOLOGY AND THE NATURE OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
AND EXPERT TESTIMONY
Rules of evidence are designed to permit the orderly and logical pre-
sentation of information to the trier of fact so that the truth may be fairly
54. See Appendix infra.
55. Id.
56. See pp. 570-72 infra.
57. E.g., Jenkins v. United States, 307 F.2d 637, 639-40 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (en banc)
(intelligence tests); Reese v. Naylor, 222 So. 2d 487, 489 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969)
(Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS)); City of Austin v. Hoffman, 379 S.W.2d
103, 110 (Tex. Ct. App. 1964) (Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scale).
58. E.g., People v. Myers, 35 Ill. 2d 311, 320, 220 N.E.2d 297, 303 (1966) (per
curiam).
59. See pp. 572-75 infra.
60. E.g., United States v. Caldwell, 543 F.2d 1333, 1353 n.99 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1087 (1976).
61. E.g., State v. Robertson, 108 R.I. 656, 659, 278 A.2d 842, 844 (1971), aff'g result
on remand, 111 R.I. 399, 303 A.2d 360 (1973).
62. But see In re Masters, 216 Minn. 553, 565, 13 N.W.2d 487, 493-94 (1944)
(dictum) (court discusses limitations on intelligence test accuracy in case involving
"restoration to capacity" of person adjudged feebleminded and committed to state
school); but cf. Dickenson v. Baltimore & 0. Chicago Term. R.R., 42 Ill. 2d 103, 108,
245 N.E.2d 762, 765 (1969) (cross-examination permitted to establish lack of scientific
accuracy of psychological testing and results).
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and justly ascertained. 63 Initial determinations of materiality and relevancy
are left to the discretion of the trier of law, and the ultimate determination of
the evidence's probative value is reserved for the trier of fact.6 4 Evidence is
considered material if it bears upon an issue in the case.6 5 The concept of
relevancy requires that there be a tendency of the evidence to establish a
material proposition.66 The appropriate inquiry is whether the information
conveyed during the course of psychological expert testimony would make
the probandum - the presence or absence of a mental disorder and the
causal connection between the criminal or tortious conduct and such a
disorder - more probable after the evidence had been received than before
its receipt.
6 7
When matters arise at trial about which the ordinary degree of
knowledge and experience of the trier of fact is insufficient to enable it to
make all the necessary inferences, the requisite knowledge and experience
may be supplied by an expert witness. 68 Historically, the "opinion" rule,
which excludes opinion testimony by laypersons, was founded on a jealous
regard for the province of the jury; however, a more plausible basis for this
theory, according to Professor Wigmore, is to avoid the presentation of
superfluous evidence.6 9 The opinion rule, however, does not apply to experts.
The crucial justification for the admissibility of expert testimony is the
63. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 102 ("These rules shall be construed to secure . . .
promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence to the end that the truth
may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined."); 1 J. WEINSTEIN & M.
BERGER, WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE 102[01], at 102-08 n.8 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE] ("But at least reasonably accurate truth finding must always
be a central purpose.").
64. E.g., United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, 163-64 (8th Cir. 1975); United
States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431, 438 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971); 1 J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 12, at 299 (3d ed. 1940). See James, Relevancy, Probability and
the Law, 29 CALIF L. REV. 689 (1941).
65. E.g., FED. R. EVID. 401; MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
§ 185 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972) [hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK].
66. See FED. R. EVID. 401 (" 'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination
of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.");
MCCORMICK, supra note 65, § 185, at 435. The federal rule does not alter the analysis;
it merely combines the requirements of materiality and relevance into a single rule.
67. Generally, psychological testimony is based on the psychologist's firsthand
observations of the party in question, and the issue of hearsay evidence is rarely
raised. Compare Spann v. Bees, 23 Md. App. 313, 327 A.2d 801 (1974) (direct
examination of plaintiff) with Henderson v. State, 159 Ind. App. 621, 308 N.E.2d 710
(1974) (opinion as to defendant's sanity at time of crime based, in part, upon interview
with accused's family challenged as hearsay). However, even hearsay bases for
psychological opinions are permitted by the federal rules of evidence. FED. R. EVID.
703. See also Note, Hearsay Bases of Psychiatric Opinion Testimony: A Critique of
Federal Rule of Evidence 703, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 129 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Hearsay Bases].
68. Rosenthal, The Development of the Use of Expert Testimony, 2. L. &
CONTEMP. PROB. 403, 404 (1935).
69. 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 64, § 557. 7 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1918, 1920
(rev. ed. J. Chadbourn 1978);-see Rosenthal, supra note 68, at 411-412.
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expert's ability to relate to the trier of fact accurate conceptions about a
particular matter that is beyond the ken of the ordinary layperson.
Experiential capacity is the "skill to acquire accurate conceptions," and a
person possessing this skill is considered an expert for evidentiary
purposes. 70 Although expertise need not be linked with occupational
experience or systematic training in a particular field to be deemed
admissible, these two experiential factors frequently distinguish the expert's
knowledge from the layperson's general knowledge and necessitate a
preliminary offer of proof. Generally, the party proffering expert testimony
must submit to the trier of law evidence of the expert's special or peculiar
training, education, or experience with regard to the matter in question.71
For psychological experts, this offer of proof typically involves the recitation
of their education, training, and professional experience and affiliations.
The determination of whether an expert possesses the requisite experiential
capacity is traditionally left to the discretion of the trial court. 72 The tacit
assumption is that evidence of education and experience alone will assure
that the information and opinions being conveyed to the trier of fact will not
only be outside the jury's general or ordinary experience but are also
sufficiently accurate to be helpful to the trier of fact without unfair
prejudice. 73
In light of the underlying purpose of expert testimony, two major
criticisms regarding the relevance of psychological evidence and expert
testimony may be made. First, such evidence must be excluded because it is
irrelevant - it has no tendency to make the existence of any fact of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than the existence of such fact would be without it. This argument
is a radical departure from current practice given the courts' pervasive use of
psychological experts. If it could be satisfactorily demonstrated that
psychological judgments and opinions are not more reliable than chance,
then the trier of law would be justified in excluding such testimony because
it would not be even minimally probative Second, if psychological expert
testimony is minimally probative, it is inadmissible because its probative
value is outweighed by various countervailing factors. Each of these
arguments is discussed at length below, but first the nature and purpose of
scientific expert testimony must be examined.
Nature of Scientific Expert Testimony
Not every purportedly scientific principle is automatically acceptable to
the court as the basis for expert testimony. Exactly what type of evidence
courts will classify as "scientific" and apply special rules of admissibility
70. 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 64, § 555, at 633.
71. Id. § 556, at 635.
72. Id. § 561.
73. See 7 J. WIGMORE, supra note 69, § 1923.
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and exclusion to has never been satisfactorily explicated.74 Accidents of
history 75 or society's gradual legitimation of a particular scientific
profession, as evidenced by licensure for example,76 may play a decisive role.
While the admissibility of an expert's testimony generally hinges on its
helpfulness to the trier of fact in a particular case, the admissibility of a
scientific technique turns on its reliability, which must be evaluated in terms
of a legal standard in order to promote uniformity and consistency of
decision-making. 77
A. The Frye Test
The most widely recognized standard that courts use to evaluate the
admissibility of scientific evidence and its supporting expert testimony is
that espoused in Frye v. United States."' Citing no authority, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia observed:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the
experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere
in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be
recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert
testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or
discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be
sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the
particular field in which it belongs. 79
74. MCCORMICK, supra note 65, § 203, at 488; Strong, Questions Affecting the
Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, 1970 U. ILL. L.F. 1, 11.
75. McCoRMICK, supra note 65, § 203, at 488.
76. E.g., Psychologists' Certification Act, MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, §.§ 618-639 (1971
& Cum. Supp. 1979). See Hess, Entry Requirements for Professional Practice of
Psychology, 32 AM. PSYCHOL. 365, 365 (1977) (as of 1977 practice of psychology
regulated by statute in forty-nine states and District of Columbia).
77. See Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 381, 391 A.2d 364, 367-68 (1978).
78. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (admissibility of systolic blood pressure deception
test or "lie detector"). See Boyce, Judicial Recognition of Scientific Evidence in
Criminal Cases, 8 UTAH L. REV. 313, 313 (1963-1964); Strong, supra note 74, at 10-11;
Note, Evolving Methods of Scientific Proof, 13 N.Y.L.F. 677, 682 (1967) [hereinafter
cited as Evolving Methods]. The Frye test has been cited with approval by a majority
of the federal circuits and almost all of the state courts that have considered the
question of the admissibility of scientific evidence. E.g., United States v. Kilgus, 571
F.2d 508, 510 (9th Cir. 1978) (forward-looking infrared system); United States v.
Brown, 557 F.2d 541, 556-57 (6th Cir. 1977) (dictum) (ion microprobic analysis of hair
sample); United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, 163 (8th Cir. 1975) (polygraph
analysis); United States v. Carter, 522 F.2d 666, 685 n.67 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(identification of drawings or "doodles" left on desk pad at scene of burglary); United
States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 (1975) (voice
spectrograph analysis); United States v. Cochran, 499 F.2d 380, 393 (5th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1124 (1975) (polygraph analysis); Marks v. United States, 260
F.2d 377, 382 (10th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 929 (1959) (polygraph analysis);
Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 381-85, 391 A.2d 364, 368-69 (1978) (review of cases
involving scientific evidence).
79. 293 F. at 1014.
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The fundamental weakness of the Frye test, as originally formulated,
was that it permitted members of a particular "scientific" profession to
assert the truthfulness of their theories without requiring that some
objective standard of reliability be met.8° The Frye decision implies that
"general scientific acceptance" of a theory by members of the particular
field in question will somehow ensure the accuracy of the scientific evidence
based upon that principle.8' This assumption is unfounded for two reasons.
First, for legal purposes scientific theories are useful only insofar as
they consistently and accurately classify or explain various phenomena. For
centuries dramatists, philosophers, theologians, and jurists have scrutinized
human behavior in an effort to comprehend the inner workings of the mind.
80. Strong, supra note 74, at 9-15. Cf. FED. R. EVID. 703 ("The facts or data in the
particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those
perceived by or made known to him at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably
relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon
the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.") As a practical
matter, this rule carries Frye one step further. Once the court accepts the witness as
an expert, it generally does not attempt to second-guess the reliability of the
information upon which the expert relies, thereby permitting absolute self-validation.
See Gibbons, Rules 701-706: Opinions and Expert Testimony, 20 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE
500, 503-06 (1977). See generally Hearsay Bases, supra note 67.
81. McCormick observed that the phrase "generally accepted as reliable" may
carry different connotations depending upon whether it is the court or the scientists
defining its meaning, MCCORMICK, supra note 65, § 203 n.32, and advocated that
disagreement in the scientific community regarding the reliability of scientific
evidence should go to its weight rather than its admissibility:
"General scientific acceptance" is a proper condition for taking judicial notice
of scientific facts, but not a criterion for the admissibility of scientific
evidence. Any relevant conclusions which are supported by a qualified expert
witness should be received unless there are other reasons for exclusion.
Particularly, probative value may be overborne by the familiar dangers of
prejudicing or misleading the jury, and undue consumption of time.
Id. at 491 (footnotes omitted). The potential lack of uniformity in determining on a
case-by-case basis whether a particular scientific technique is valid is the primary
criticism of this approach. Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 387, 391 A.2d 364, 371 (1978).
But see id. at 400-09, 391 A.2d at 377-82 (Smith, J., dissenting).
If, for example, the principles of phrenology were to gain wide recognition
among its practitioners as a scientifically valid means of predicting dangerousness,
strict interpretation of the Frye test would lead to the conclusion that such expert
testimony was admissible. See generally R. SLOVENKO, PSYCHIATRY AND LAw 38-39 &
n.19 (1973). A narrow view of the "general scientific acceptance" standard has led to
the exclusion of both polygraph and voice spectrograph identification techniques as
evidence in some jurisdictions. E.g., Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 391 A.2d 364 (1978).
See generally Decker & Handler, Voiceprint Identification Evidence - Out of the Frye
Pan and Into Admissibility, 26 AM. U.L. REV. 314 (1977); Strong, supra note 74, at 12;
Tarlow, Admissibility of Polygraph Evidence in 1975: An Aid in Determining
Credibility in a Perjury-Plagued System, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 917 (1975). That something
more than acceptance by a particular scientific discipline is required has been
recognized in the context of the admissibility of polygraph examinations. At least one
federal circuit has rejected the argument that the polygraph need only attain general
acceptance among polygraph operators to satisfy the test for admissibility. United
States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, 164 n.6 (8th Cir. 1975).
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This fascination with our "psychological being" underwent a radical
transformation in the late nineteenth century when Freud introduced his
psychoanalytic theory. It was during this period that the observation of
human behavior was systematically subjected to the rigors of the scientific
method.8 2 To be of any scientific value, a theory of personality must be
evaluated in empirical terms: 3 how easily does it permit the user to move
from abstract theory to empirical observation and vice versa?84 Typically,
the scientific method involves the systematic verification and articulation of
a paradigm theory through empirical observations.85 Greatly simplified,
scientific analysis transforms these theoretical constructs into empirically
verifiable principles that tend to explain certain phenomena or to predict
their occurrence.8 6 Recognition by a particular scientific community,
however, cannot be the decisive sine qua non for evidentiary purposes.8 7 The
fact that certain psychological techniques are sufficiently established to
82. Despite Freud's urge to speculate about politics, religion, and culture, he
clearly intended psychoanalysis to be an empirical science: "Freud saw himself as an
intellectual conquistador, the leader of a movement to extend the vision of science, by
rational means, beyond the limits the empiricists had set for it." P. RIEFF, FREUD: THE
MIND OF THE MORALIST 2 (Anchor ed. 1961) (footnote omitted). See Amicus brief for
American Psychological Association, Jenkins v. United States, 307 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir.
1962 (en banc), reprinted in READINGS, supra note 52, at 156 ("In any inquiry as to
the testimonial competence of a psychologist to express an expert professional
opinion, it is important to understand that psychology is an established science which
makes use of the same fundamental methods of investigation and inquiry and the
same criteria of objectivity and thoroughness as are used in all recognized scientific
disciplines."); Scheibe, The Psychologist's Advantage and Its Nullification: Limits of
Human Predictability, 33 AM. PSYCHOL. 869, 869 (1978).
It frequently has been observed that the science of human behavior is still in
its infancy and cannot meet the degree of precision expected of the physical sciences.
E.g., C. HALL & G. LINDZEY, THEORIES OF PERSONALITY 69 (3d ed. 1978); Diamond &
Louisell, The Psychiatrist as an Expert Witness: Some Ruminations and Speculations,
63 MICH. L. Rev. 1335, 1341-42 (1965). Even if this is true, such an argument ignores
the important threshold requirement that scientific evidence in a court of law must be
shown to be at least logically relevant - accurate greater than chance. See pp.
560-62 infra. Without this minimal showing, laypersons may be expected to be just as
accurate as the "experts."
83. Roth, Dayley & Lerner, Into the Abyss: Psychiatric Reliability and
Emergency Commitment Statutes, 13 SANTA CLARA LAw. 400, 402-03 (1973).
84. C. HALL & G. LINDZEY, supra note 82, at 15.
85. T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 10-22 (2d ed. 1970).
Kuhn theorizes that scientific advances may be conceptualized as a series of
revolutionary steps, each accompanied by its own characteristic and dominant
paradigm. Initially, there is a wide variety of competing theories and investigations
until one particular set of ideas assumes the position of dominance. Hall and Lindzey
observe that psychology has not advanced beyond the "preparadigmatic state":
"There is no single theory that serves as a 'paradigm' to order known findings,
determine relevance, provide an establishment against which rebels may struggle,
and dictate the major path of future investigation." C. HALL & G. LINDZEY, supra note
82, at 15.
86. C. HALL & G. LINDZEY, supra note 82, at 9-15; T. KUHN, supra note 85, at 24.
See MCCORMICK, supra note 65, § 203, at 488-89; Scheibe, supra note 82, at 869.
87. See Strong, supra note 74, at 12.
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have gained general acceptance among psychologists offers no assurance
that the information generated will serve as a reliable and valid basis for
psychological judgments. As demonstrated below, the hidden premise
underlying the Frye test is that the admissibility of scientific evidence ought
to be evaluated in terms of its potential accuracy: how consistently do
particular scientific techniques and the theories upon which they are based
explain or predict certain phenomena in empirical terms? Without this
critical proof of accuracy, scientific expert testimony would merely reflect
the expert's personal opinions and beliefs. Recent cases dealing with the
admissibility of various scientific techniques and supporting expert
testimony have read such a proof of accuracy requirement into the Frye
test.
A second, and comparatively minor, criticism is that the Frye test does
not take into account those sciences that do not have dominant or "well-
recognized" principles supported by a sufficiently large body of experts. The
question of what groups are to be considered in determining the general
scientific acceptance of various techniques also poses difficulties.8 9 These
weaknesses are of particular importance in psychology because no single
model or theory of human behavior has attained wide acceptance among
practitioners 9 and because novel, but accurate, scientific techniques may
appear faster than there are experts to validate them. 91 The trend toward
eclecticism in psychology may also create a situation in which experts who
support a particular constellation of behavioral theories may be difficult to
locate.92
B. Modern Interpretations of the Frye Test
Because of the broad language of the Frye test, modem interpretations
of this standard have added a critically important gloss. In conjunction with
the "general scientific acceptability" principle, most courts require a
demonstration of accuracy. For example, in United States v. Franks,93 the
defendants challenged the admissibility of voiceprints on the ground that
voice spectrographic analysis was too inaccurate to be admitted into
evidence. In upholding the trial court's admission of such a novel scientific
technique, the Sixth Circuit observed with regard to the Frye test: "[W]e
deem general acceptance as being nearly synonymous with reliability. If a
scientific process is reliable, or sufficiently accurate, courts may also deem it
88. See pp. 560-62 infra.
89. See, e.g., Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 495-96, 391 A.2d 364, 424 (1978) (Smith,
J., dissenting).
90. See generally C. HALL & G. LINDZEY, supra note 82.
91. Evolving Methods, supra note 78, at 684-85; see United States v. Addison,
498 F.2d 741, 743-44 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
92. See Diamond & Louisell, supra note 82, at 1339.
93. 511 F.2d 25 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975).
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'generally accepted.' '94 Citing Franks, the Eighth Circuit held in United
States v. Alexander95 that the results of polygraph examinations of
unstipulated accuracy should not be admitted into evidence at a criminal
trial,96 noting: "The reliability of a scientific technique is one of the most
important factors that courts should consider in determining whether that
technique is generally accepted in the scientific community." 97 In a footnote
to its opinion, the Alexander court explained: "This ['general scientific
acceptability'] test does not compel a showing of infallibility, but does
require the submission of probative evidence indicating general acceptance
in the relevant scientific community of the theory underlying such
technique, as well as sufficient assurance of accuracy and reliability."98
Psychological evidence and expert testimony should be required to meet
the Frye test's broad "general scientific acceptance" standard as well as to
demonstrate that such evidence is accurate by some increment greater than
chance before it may be deemed logically relevant by the trier of law.99
According to the "logical relevance" theory,100 any evidence having a
tendency to prove any material fact must be admitted. 10 Thus, everything
that is even minimally probative should be deemed prima facie admissi-
ble. 0 2 Based upon this concept, it appears that the threshold for admitting
scientific expert testimony should be whenever it is more likely to be true
than lay opinion.'0 3 Translating this test into scientific terms, the
probability that the evidence is more truthful than not is tantamount to
requiring that its accuracy be greater than what might be expected by
chance. Once this minimum threshold is reached, the jury would decide the
weight to be accorded such evidence. 0 4 Although the courts have held that a
scientific technique offered at trial need not be supported by absolute
94. Id. at 33 n.12; accord, United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541, 556 (6th Cir.
1977); see Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 381-82, 391 A.2d 364, 367-68 (1978). Concern for
reasonable reliability may even be replacing the "general scientific acceptance"
standard. See id. at 416-17, 391 A.2d at 385 (Smith, J., dissenting).
95. 526 F.2d 161 (8th Cir. 1975).
96. Id. at 166.
97. Id. at 163; see United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1198-99 (2d Cir. 1978)
(voice spectrogram).
98. Id. at 163 n.3 (emphasis added).
99. Cf. 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 990 (rev. ed. J. Chadbourn 1970) ("Judicial
practice should liberally make use of [scientific experimental tests by psychologists].
All that should be required as a condition is the preliminary testimony of a scientist
that the proposed test is an accepted one in his profession and that it has a reasonable
measure of precision in its indications." (emphasis added)). Wigmore characterizes the
accuracy of a scientific device or process as its capacity for "trustworthiness." 3 Id.
§ 795, at 244.
100. See Trautman, Logical or Legal Relevancy - A Conflict in Theory, 5 VAND.
L. REV. 385, 391 (1952); Evolving Methods, supra note 78, at 683.
101. See FED. R. EvID. 402; Trautman, supra note 100, at 388-92.
102. Trautman, supra note 100. at 392.
103. See Romero, The Admissibility of Scientific Evidence Under the New Mexico
and Federal Rules of Evidence, 6 N.M.L. REV. 187, 198-201 (1976).
104. See Decker & Handler, supra note 81, at 362 n.304.
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certainty of result or unanimity of scientific opinion to be admissible, 1 5 the
degree of accuracy required is uniformly high. The trier of law is responsible
for assessing logical relevance. 10 6 Thus, the first hurdle psychological
evidence and expert testimony must surmount is to demonstrate that it is
logically relevant - accurate more than chance - and therefore admissible.
The Probative Value of Psychological Evidence and Expert Testimony
Psychological expert testimony at trial typically consists of three
elements: (1) a factual description of the party's behavior during the course
of the clinical examination and a report on the nature and results of any
psychological tests administered, (2) a diagnosis of the individual's mental
condition, and (3) an opinion as to the causal connection between the mental
disorder and the issue of ultimate fact. These three testimonial components
correspond to the three levels of psychological expert testimony discussed in
the Introduction.10 7
Scientific evidence may be excluded by the trier of law for two reasons.
First, it may be demonstrated that the evidence is so unreliable that it has
no tendency to prove the probandum for which it is offered - the logical
relevancy argument.
Second, even if the scientific techniques are sufficiently accurate to
warrant their prima facie admission, the evidentiary counterweights require
that the evidence and supporting testimony be excluded. Each of these
reasons will be examined in turn.
105. United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431, 438 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
994 (1971) ("[N]either newness nor lack of absolute certainty in a test suffices to
render it inadmissible in court. Every useful new development must have its first day
in court."); see United States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1019 (1975).
106. Evolving Methods, supra note 78, at 685. In Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 391
A.2d 364 (1978), the Maryland Court of Appeals held in a four to three decision that
the admission of voiceprint evidence in a criminal trial constituted reversible error.
Evaluating the admissibility of this novel technique, the court noted that if the
reliability of a scientific technique could not be judicially noticed, its validity must be
demonstrated before testimony based on it could be introduced into evidence. The
Court observed that evidence of reliability could consist of expert witness testimony
as well as the introduction of law journal articles, articles in scientific journals, and
other publications bearing on scientific acceptance. The Court of Appeals rejected the
argument that such inquires go to the weight, and not to admissibility, of scientific
evidence. Id. at 386-88, 391 A.2d at 370-71; see note 81 supra, By adopting the Frye
standard, the Court sought to avoid the "intolerable" problem of inconsistent
judgments when a particular scientific technique is deemed reliabile by the jury in one
case but not in another. The Reed Court observed: "[T]he reliability of the underlying
technique or process to perform as it is supposed to does not vary with different
cases." Id. at 387, 391 A.2d at 371.
107. See pp. 540-41 supra.
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A. The Exclusion of Psychological Evidence and Expert Testimony
as Logically Irrelevant
Depending upon the court's familiarity with the particular scientific
technique in question, it may skip the first step in the analysis by taking
judicial notice of psychology and thereby preclude any inquiry into the
potential accuracy of the evidence. 08 Why the courts do not subject
psychological evidence and expert testimony to the same sort of scrutiny
novel scientific evidence receives remains a mystery. One explanation may
be that the courts presume that the wide recognition psychology has
received over the years legitimates it as a scientifically sound discipline and
that such societal approval is tantamount to a guarantee of accuracy
approaching that of other scientific specialties. It is theorized that as
society began to legitimate the discipline of psychology, as evidenced by
licensing statutes, psychologists sought recognition of that expertise in the
courts. In those states without such statutes, but whose courts routinely
qualified psychologists as experts, the proponents of licensure could point to
such qualification as an indicator of their recognition as experts. This
bootstrapping effect simultaneously resulted in the legitimation of psychol-
ogy and its techniques publicly and in the courts. The recognition by the
courts that expertise in mental disorders was not limited to those with
medical training was the crucial turning point in the legitimation process. 10 9
Although courts often spoke in terms of the probable probative value of
psychological opinions, they rarely took the opportunity to scrutinize the
scientific underpinnings of the discipline and its techniques, deferring either
to the legislative determination that psychology was a licensable scientific
discipline or to the psychologists, who claimed to possess such special
knowledge or skill about human behavior that the ordinary layperson
without their training and experience would be unable to perceive important,
legally relevant evidence. The courts evidently considered satisfactory proof
of the psychological experts' education and experience sufficient to ensure
that psychological evidence and expert testimony would be minimally
108. Judicial notice is taken when "judge[s] ... decide questions of fact which are
common knowledge in the community or to which one right answer is available from
sources of indisputable accuracy." Roberts, Preliminary Notes Toward a Study of
Judicial Notice, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 210, 218 (1967) (footnote omitted). By deciding
questions of scientific fact as if they were questions of law with only one right answer,
judicial notice forecloses all debate because taking judicial notice of a matter implies
that it is indisputable, and no evidence to the contrary is admissible to dispute the
indisputable. Id. at 218-19; see Morgan, Judicial Notice, 57 HARV. L. REV. 269, 279
(1944). Ordinarily, a party may argue at trial whether judicial notice should be taken
of a particular fact. In cases involving psychological expert testimony, however, the
courts appear to take "judicial notice" of psychology tacitly; consequently, there is no
opportunity at trial to raise objections about the overall accuracy of psychological
evidence. Roberts refers to a similar problem regarding the presentation of the
validity of the scientific principle underlying a blood test to demonstrate non-
paternity. Roberts, supra, at 218.
109. See note 52 supra.
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probative. Consequently, no independent, critical evaluation of the scientific
accuracy of psychological techniques and the diagnoses based thereon was
necessary. If the experts are properly qualified in terms of their education
and experience and their consensus is that the techniques involved are
generally accepted by psychologists, an inquiry into the empirical founda-
tions of psychological evidence and judgments may appear irrelevant to the
courts. The courts will then rely upon rigorous cross-examination to expose
the evidentiary weaknesses of the specific scientific techniques in question.
The scientific validity of psychological evidence and judgments may
simply be taken for granted by the courts because the relevant community of
experts in psychology tends to ignore the negative data regarding the
reliability and validity of psychological testing,110 and they may be unaware
of the subjective biases that significantly influence their clinical judg-
ments."' Because there is little apparent controversy over psychological
testing and diagnoses, such evidence would be readily admitted under the
Frye standard unless the added dimension of scientific reliability and
validity were scrutinized by the court to assess its underlying truth value.
Unless judicial notice, tacit or otherwise, is taken of psychological
techniques, the burden is on those wishing to introduce such evidence to
prove that the psychological tests and judgments in question meet the
threshold for admissibility - accuracy greater than chance. The argument
that reliance upon the Frye test will eliminate lengthy and distracting
inquiries into the reliability of the scientific evidence at trial" 2 ignores the
existence of well established and ostensibly accurate scientific techniques,
such as psychological testing may not be that sufficiently accurate to
warrant their admission at trial. As will be demonstrated, general scientific
acceptance, at least in the field of psychology, does not necessarily offer any
assurance of accuracy.
The probative value of psychological evidence should be analyzed as
other types of novel scientific evidence are. A convenient analogue is
polygraph evidence. While the particular scientific techniques and principles
underlying polygraph expert testimony are quite different from those in
psychology, both are ostensibly scientific disciplines, and there is no
compelling rationale for treating one differently from the other.
In United States v. Alexander,"13 the key issue on appeal was whether
the polygraph machine and technique had attained sufficient scientific
acceptance among experts in the relevant scientific disciplines to justify the
admission into evidence of the results of a polygraph examination of
unstipulated accuracy. 14 The three crucial factors that led to the Eighth
110. See text accompanying notes 193 to 194 infra.
111. See pp. 582-87 infra.
112. See Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 388-89, 391 A.2d 364, 371-72 (1978).
113. 526 F.2d 161 (8th Cir. 1975).
114. Id. at 164.
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Circuit's exclusion of that evidence were lack of accuracy,"15 the potential
bias of the expert,"1 6 and the influence of extrinsic and uncontrollable
factors on the test results.' 1 7 Each of these criticisms and others are
applicable to psychological evidence and expert testimony.
1. Accuracy of Psychological Tests
Psychology's most ambitious attempt to quantify human behavior has
been through the use of psychological tests and techniques." s Testing
appears to play an important role in a clinician's professional activities, and
substantial time is devoted to psychological testing irrespective of a
psychologist's clinical orientation." 9 Psychological tests are essentially
objective and standardized measures of samples of behavior 2° and have
been devised to measure a variety of factors such as character and
personality, intelligence, educational achievement, vocational aptitude, and
psychopathology. 12 There are no psychological tests that purport to
measure mental competency based upon a legal standard.122
A fundamental criticism of psychological tests and techniques is that
their accuracy may be a function of the methodology used to evaluate the
data they generate. The selection of assessment technique may significantly
alter both the accuracy and objectivity of the results. 23 Other criticisms of
115. Based upon the available literature, the Alexander court observed that
commentators had estimated the error rate for polygraphs to be between nine and
twenty-five percent or more. Id. at 165. See Horvath, The Effect of Selected Variables
on Interpretation of Polygraph Records, 62 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 127 (1977).
116. The court of appeals explained:
"The distinction is that polygraphy, albeit based on a scientific theory,
remains an art with unusual responsibility placed on the examiner. The
acquainting of the examiner with the subject matter is often a source of
improper suggestion, conscious or subconscious. The preparation of the test
and discussion with the examinee of the polygraph procedure furnishes
additional opportunity for improper subjective evaluation."
526 F.2d at 167 (quoting United States v. Wilson, 361 F. Supp. 510, 512 (D. Md. 1973))
(emphasis in original).
117. The court observed: "[There are too many uncontrollable or unascertainable
factors which may affect the polygraphist's conclusion as to the veracity or falsity of
the examinee's responses." 526 F.2d at 165.
118. See generally THE EIGHTH MENTAL MEASUREMENTS YEARBOOK (0. Buros ed.
1978) [hereinafter cited as EIGHTH MMY]; THE SEVENTH MENTAL MEASUREMENTS
YEARBOOK (0. Buros ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as SEVENTH MMY].
119. Wade & Baker, Opinions and Use of Psychological Tests: A Survey of Clinical
Psychologists, 32 AM. PSYCHOL. 874, 875, 879 (1977) (71.8% of clinicians responding to
survey reported that test results were used at some stage of treatment process).
120. A. ANASTASI, PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING (4th ed. 1976). Despite the apparent
popularity of psychological testing, inferences about underlying "disease" processes
drawn from such techniques are merely theoretical speculations. As one commentator
observed: "Behavior is the only data in mental health diagnosis that all diagnosti-
cians would agree is relevant." Morse, supra note 3, at 546.
121. See generally EIGHTH MMY, supra note 118; SEVENTH MMY, supra note 118.
122. J. ZISKIN, supra note 12, at 146-47.
123. The controversy continues over whether psychological tests involving either
an actuarial or clinical method of assessment yield a significantly superior predictive
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psychological tests and techniques typically focus on one or more of the
following factors: (1) adequacy of standardization, (2) low reliability or
insufficient data on reliability, and (3) low validity or insufficient data on
validity.124
Standardization. This term refers to the uniformity of the administra-
tion and scoring of psychological tests.125 Standardization poses two crucial
problems. First, deviations from the test instructions as to exactly how the
testing materials are to be administered may influence test results
significantly. 126 Second, the person being tested must conform to the limited
features of the test's normative population or biased interpretations may
result. 127 Despite the availability of standardized scoring for both non-
projective and projective tests, personalized procedures based on the
clinician's experience appear to be the favored means of evaluating test
results.128
Reliability. Test reliability is the consistency of scores obtained by the
same persons when retested with the identical test or with an equivalent
form of the test.129 Professional standards for test reliability generally
require a coefficient of about .80 or higher.13° One commentator argues that
result. E.g., A. ANASTASI, supra note 120, at 485-87; Meehl, Seer Over Sign: The First
Good Example, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH PERSONALITY 27, 27 (1965). Actuarial,
or statistical, assessment is an analytical procedure designed to permit any person or
machine properly trained or programmed always to score the same test identically. J.
ZISKIN, supra note 12, at 147-48. Clinical assessment is a method of analysis that is
mediated by the individual evaluator's judgment and reflection; hence, the scoring
may vary from psychologist to psychologist. Id. Overall, statistical prediction is
nearly always more accurate. Morse, supra note 3, at 594. One recent study concludes:
"[C]linical judgment plays an important role in the testing process for most clinicians.
Clinical judgment not only affected test interpretation but also the use of test results."
Wade & Baker, supra note 119, at 876.
124. J. ZISKIN, supra note 12, at 149. See generally Bersoff, Silk Purses into Sow's
Ears: The Decline of Psychological Testing and a Suggestion for Its Redemption, 28
AM. PSYCHOL. 892 (1973).
125. A. ANASTASI, supra note 120, at 25.
126. Id. at 25-26; L. CRONBACH, ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING 53 (3d ed.
1970); see AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR EDUCATIONAL &
PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTS §§ C1-C3.5, at 17-19 (1974) [hereinafter cited as APA
STANDARDS]. The APA STANDARDS have been widely recognized by the federal
government and the federal courts. Lerner, The Supreme Court and the APA, AERA,
NCME Test Standards: Past References and Future Possibilities, 33 AM. PSYCHOL.
915 (1978); see note 132 infra. The standardization of norms permits the test score to
be interpreted by comparison with the scores of some normative population. Thus, the
standardized scores obtained from one norm group may not be appropriate for
everyone. A. ANASTASI, supra note 120, at 88-90; see APA STANDARDS, supra, §§ D1-
D7, at 19-24. The broader the norm group the greater the likelihood that the test
results will be generalizable. A. ANASTASI, supra note 120, at 89-90.
127. See J. ZISKIN, supra note 12, at 152-53.
128. Wade & Baker, supra note 119, at 875-76. (38.9% favored personalized
procedures for evaluating objective tests, and 81.5% favored such procedures for
projective tests).
129. A. ANASTASI, supra note 120, at 27; see APA STANDARDS, supra note 126,
§§F1-F3, at 48-52.
130. A. ANASTASI, supra note 120, at 109.
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courts should exclude any testimony or conclusion based upon the results of
a test with a correlation coefficient of less than .80 on the grounds that it
fails to meet the standards of reliability accepted by the profession and thus
cannot support a conclusion with "reasonable certainty."'131
Validity. The traditional definition of test validity is the extent to
which a test actually measures what it purports to measure. 132 The
determination of validity usually requires the comparison of test results with
independent, external criteria of whatever the test is designed to measure.133
The modern interpretation of this concept is that "no method or instrument
of assessment is valid or invalid a priori," and "[t]he validity of a measuring
device must be evaluated in terms of the purpose for which it is intended."'1 34
The level of validity an instrument must attain before it may be deemed
acceptable is essentially a comparative measure. There is no general answer
to the question of how high a validity coefficient should be.135 If the
treatment of validity in the employment and school testing contexts may be
extended to psychological testing generally, three different concepts of
validity emerge. First, if no other assessment techniques are available, the
validity of a new instrument may be evaluated in comparison with the
correlation that might be expected by chance, which is 0.00.136 Second, the
validity of a new test may be evaluated by comparing it with other available
instruments to determine if the new test significantly reduces selection
errors. A new test may also be used in combination with existing ones to
determine if its addition to the battery increases their independent validity
131. J. ZISKIN, supra note 12, at 154.
132. A. ANASTASI, supra note 120, at 28; see APA STANDARDS, supra note 126,
§§ El-E2.3, at 25-33. The validity of psychological tests has been the focal point of a
trilogy of recent employment discrimination cases decided by the Supreme Court.
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 247 n.13 (1976); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
422 U.S. 405, 425-36 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); see EEOC
Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1607.3-1607.8 (1978);
OFCC Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-3.5 to -3.7,-3.12
to -3.13 (1978). See generally articles and notes cited note 2 supra. The Supreme Court
has recognized the importance of three types of validity, "criterion," "construct," and
"content" validity. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 247 n.13 (1976).
If a test is designed to indicate aptitude for science studies, for example, and a
significant number of students taking the test either score high and subsequently do
poorly in science (false positive) or score low and do well (false negative), the test is of
dubious value for discriminating between the persons who will be successful science
students and those who will not.
133. A. ANASTASI, supra note 120, at 28.
134. Bersoff, supra note 124, at 893.
135. A. ANASTASI, supra note 120, at 165.
136. See EEOC Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R.
§ 1607.5(c)(1) (1978); OFCC Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 41 C.F.R.
§ 60-3.12(b)(5) (1978); DHEW Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap in
Programs and Activities Receiving or Benefiting from Federal Financial Assistance,
45 C.F.R. § 84.13(a)(2) (1978). A perfect positive correlation between the test -and the
external standard is denoted as 1.00. A perfect negative correlation is -1.00. If there is
absolutely no relationship between these elements, the expected correlation will be
chance or 0.00.
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incrementally. 3 7 Third, validity may be viewed in an absolute or practical
sense when the correlation's margin of error must be relatively small. This
third approach has been alluded to in the federal regulations governing
employment testing138 and, in effect, has been imposed by the courts in at
least two instances. 139 The implication is that if the correlation is not perfect
or near perfect, the test will be deemed unacceptable because some of the
persons singled out by the instrument do not really fulfill the criterion, and
those not selected may be highly qualified.
There are three types of test validity: content validity, criterion-related
validity, and construct validity. "Content validity" is the systematic
examination of test content to determine whether it covers a representative
sample of the skills or knowledge the individual should have mastered. 140 A
test may appear valid because it consists of questions regarding a particular
subject matter, but it really may not be valid.' 4' A number of other subtle
137. See text accompanying notes 191 to 192 infra.
138. EEOC Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(c)(2)
(1978).
139. Armstead v. Starkville Mun. Separate School Dist., 461 F.2d 276, 280 (5th Cir.
1972) (Graduate Record Examination scores used for hiring teachers not reliable or
valid measure for that purpose because "cut-off score would eliminate some good
teachers"); Merriken v. Cressman, 364 F. Supp. 913, 920 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (questionnaire
designed to identify potential drug abusers in public junior high school found to result
in significant errors in identification). Summarizing the holding in Merriken, one
commentator states:
Validity coefficients that psychologists might find highly acceptable may not
pass constitutional muster. One court has ruled that "[w]hen a program talks
about labeling someone as a particular type and such a label could remain
with him for the remainder of his life, the margin of error must be almost nil."
"Nil" implies almost nearly perfect coefficients. Few, if any, psychometric
instruments yield reliability, much less validity, coefficients above .95.
Bersoff, Regarding Psychologists Testily: Legal Regulation of Psychological Assess-
ment in the Public Schools (to be published in 39 MD. L. REv. (1979)) (footnote
omitted). The courts' understanding of the level of validity that should be required
before a test can be deemed acceptable may be considered naive by psychologists;
however, it is clear that to the extent that psychological tests inform the legal
decision-making process their validity must be uniformly high.
In the employment testing context, however, the federal regulations
governing such assessment techniques only require that the relationship between the
test and at least one relevant criterion be statistically significant to the 0.05 level. See
note 136 supra. This suggests that an employment test may be considered valid even
if the margin of error is relatively large as long as the incremental validity is such
that the test will enable the decision-maker to make a somewhat more accurate
selection. The guidelines also appear to require that the tests be practically significant
- in addition to being statistically significant measures, they should also not
eliminate qualified applicants who did not pass the test. See EEOC Guidelines on
Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(c)(2) (1978).
140. A. ANASTASI, supra note 120, at 134; APA STANDARDS, supra note 126,
§§ E12-E12.4, at 28-29, 45-46.
141. This is known as face validity and should not be confused with content
validity. Face validity merely refers to whether a particular test "looks valid" to the
persons who take it and is not related to validity in a technical sense. APA
STANDARDS, supra note 126, at 29. This is generally considered a desirable feature for
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flaws in test design may also bias results.' 42 "Criterion-related validity"
indicates the effectiveness of a test in predicting an individual's behavior in
specified situations. 143 One problem with this form of validity is criteria
contamination - those persons whose judgments serve as the independent
measure of what the test is designed to predict may be influenced by the
knowledge that the person being rated did well or poorly on the test being
validated, thereby spuriously or artificially raising the correlation between
the test scores and the criterion. 144 One commentator has suggested that
only criterion-related validity has any evidentiary relevance. 115 "Construct
validity" refers to the extent to which it may be said that the test measures a
theoretical construct or trait, for example, intelligence, verbal fluency,
neuroticism, or anxiety. 146 It focuses on a broader, more enduring, and more
abstract kind of behavioral description than the other types of validity and
requires the gradual accumulation of information from a variety of
sources.
47
Psychologists typically administer one or more of the following types of
tests when they examine persons involved in litigation: intelligence tests, 48
non-projective personality tests,149 projective techniques, 1 and tests to
detect organic brain damage.' 5' Because tests to detect the presence of
organic brain damage tend to be reasonably accurate, 52 this Comment will
focus on some of the important problems associated with the interpretation
of the remaining three categories of tests.
tests in terms of rapport and public relations with the examinees. A. ANASTASI, supra
note 120, at 139-40.
142. A properly designed test should take into account the following sources of test
bias: The test must adequately cover all the major aspects of the curricular content
and in the correct proportion; the content area should be fully described in advance
rather than being defined after the test has been prepared; content must be broadly
defined to include the major objectives of instruction as well as the subject matter, i.e.,
application of principles and interpretation of data along with factual knowledge; the
content sampled by the test should not be overgeneralized; and irrelevant factors must
be excluded, e.g., is a test designed to measure the effects of instruction in
mathematics unduly influenced by the ability to understand verbal directions? A.
ANASTASI, supra note 120, at 135.
143. Id. at 140. Performance on the test is checked against a criterion, i.e., a direct
and independent measure of what the test is designed to predict. Id.; APA STANDARDS,
supra note 126, §§E3-Ell, at 26-28, 33-45.
144. A. ANASTASi, supra note 120, at 141-42.
145. J. ZISKIN, supra note 12, at 155.
146. Id. at 151; APA STANDARDS, supra note 126, §§ E13-E13.2.6, at 29-31, 46-48.
147. A. ANASTASI, supra note 120, at 151.
148. See note 57 supra.
149. See note 58 supra.
150. See notes 60 & 61 supra.
151. Buckler v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 68 Ill. App. 2d 283, 288, 216 N.E.2d 14, 17 (1966);
Spann v. Bees, 23 Md. App. 313, 317, 327 A.2d 801, 803-04 (1974).
152. See A. ANASTASI, supra note 120, at 471; Golden, Validity of the Halstead-
Reitan Neuropsychological Battery in a Mixed Psychiatric and Brain-Injured
Population, 45 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 1043 (1977). The results of these
tests are more susceptible to empirical verification by other scientifically accurate
techniques (e.g., x-rays, brain scans, electroencephalograms).
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Intelligence Tests. In general, intelligence tests are not appropriate
instruments for evaluating personality characteristics, although clinicians
may misuse the data for that purpose. 53 Studies have demonstrated that
scores on these tests may be significantly influenced by such factors as the
examinee's home environment, cultural background, state of health,
nutrition, 54 geographical location, 5 5 and even the arrangement of furniture
in the testing room. 5 6 Furthermore, examiner differences and examiner-
subject interaction may alter the results of intelligence tests.15 7
Non-Projective Tests. The most popular and exhaustively studied
instrument in this category is the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality
Inventory (MMPI)."18 Reviews of the current literature indicate that this test,
153. Ziskin warns that when psychologists employ intelligence tests as clinical
instruments in evaluating personality characteristics "the data on academic validity
have no meaning and there has been no adequate demonstration that one can assess
an individual's personality from his performance on an intelligence test." J. ZISKIN,
supra note 12, at 158; see A. ANASTASI, supra note 120, at 326.
Two of the most popular intelligence tests are the Stanford-Binet Intelligence
Scale and the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS). A. ANASTASI, supra note 120,
at 230; Wade & Baker, supra note 119, at 876 (Table 2). The validity of the former is
primarily limited to the prediction of school performance, teachers' ratings, and
achievement scores. J. ZISKIN, supra note 12, at 157. Its predictive validity for other
purposes has not been adequately demonstrated. Id. One reviewer of the literature has
noted that this test has been largely superseded by the WAIS, and given its age and
limited utility, the Stanford-Binet is about ready for retirement. See Freides, in
SEVENTH MMY, supra note 118, § 425, at 772-73. The WAIS's weaknesses include the
fact that the norms were based upon tests administered prior to 1955 and that the
scoring criteria permit a fair degree of latitude in interpreting responses. Lyman, in
SEVENTH MMY, supra note 118, § 429, at 788-90.
154. J. ZISKIN, supra note 12, at 157.
155. Tsushima & Bratton, Effects of Geographic Region upon Wechsler Adult
Intelligence Scale Results: A Hawaii - Mainland United States Comparison, 45 J.
CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 501 (1977).
156. Delprato & Jackson, The Effects of Seating Arrangement upon WAIS Digit
Span and Digit Symbol Performance, 31 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 88 (1975).
157. A. ANASTASI, supra note 120, at 33-34, 39-41; J. ZISKIN, supra note 12, at
157-58. See pp. 582-87 infra. Even scoring intelligence test responses as either a
"plus" or "minus" may lead to disagreements between experienced psychologists.
Sattler & Ryan, Scoring Agreement on the Stanford-Binet, 29 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOL.
35, 38 (1973) (comparing scoring agreement of psychologists with doctoral degrees,
trained psychology graduate students, and untrained psychology graduate students,
study concluded that scoring accuracy did not differ significantly among these groups
and that "[o]verall, the raters showed considerable scoring disagreement").
158. A. ANASTASI, supra note 120, at 497. See Butcher & Tellegen, Common
Methodological Problems in MMPI Research, 46 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL
PSYCHOL. 620 (1978). The MMPI consists of 550 affirmative statements to which the
examinee gives the response "true," "false," or "cannot say." A. ANASTASI, supra note
120, at 497. The test yields a profile analysis based upon the interrelationships of the
scores on ten clinical scales. A high score on a scale has been found to predict
positively the corresponding final clinical diagnosis or estimate in more than sixty
percent of new psychiatric admissions. Ellis, in THE FIlrH MENTAL MEASUREMENTS
YEARBOOK § 86, at 166-67 (0. Buros ed. 1959).
The ten clinical scales are hypochondriasis, depression, hysteria, psycho-
pathic deviate, masculinity-feminity, paranoia, psychasthenia, schizophrenia, hypo-
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in the hands of an expert, may provide valid and clinically useful
information about the emotional status of a cooperative subject, but its
ability to aid in diagnostic classification is not well established.15 9 The "true-
false-cannot say" format of the MMPI may also alter the reliability of the
test, given the fact that some people tend to respond to all questions that
strike them as equivocal by consistently selecting one of these responses. 16°
Although the MMPI has a built-in "lie" scale, it is difficult to detect those
subjects who respond in terms of what they believe to be the socially
desirable answer and not as themselves.1 61 The extent to which self-report
inventories such as the MMPI are subject to examinee dissembling and
response sets has not been fully evaluated. 162 The MMPI also suffers from
inadequate reliability. 16 3 Many of the interscore differences that determine
the final profile code may result from chance. 164 The MMPI has been
characterized as a "psychometric nightmare" by one psychological re-
mania and social introversion. Eight of them (all except the masculinity-femininity
and social introversion scales) consist of items that differentiated between a specified
clinical group and a normal control group of approximately 700 persons who were
predominantly rural Minnesota adults with less than a high school education. This
geographically and educationally atypical population sample has introduced many
non-generalizable anomalies into the scale contents. Rodgers, in SEVENTH MMY,
supra note 118, § 104, at 248-49; see A. ANASTASI, supra note 120, at 503-04. Also, this
sample does not adequately account for cultural differences. A. ANASTASI, supra note
120, at 504; Costello, Tiffany & Gier, Methodological Issues and Racial (Black-White)
Comparisons on the MMPI, 38 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 161 (1972);
Gynther, in SEVENTH MMY, supra note 118, § 104, at 242; Gynther, White Norms and
Black MMPIs: A Prescription for Discrimination?, 78 PSYCHOL. BULL. 386 (1972); Witt
& Gynther, Another Explanation for Black-White MMPI Differences, 31 J. CLINICAL
PSYCHOL. 69 (1975).
The principal applications of the MMPI are in the area of differential
diagnosis. A. ANASTASI, supra note 120, at 500. The original MMPI scales were
designed to discriminate between normals and certain traditional diagnostic
categories, but in subsequent usage, the scales have been treated as measures of
personality traits. Id. at 501. Examiners are cautioned against interpreting literally
the clinical scales. For example, it cannot be assumed that a high score on the
schizophrenia scale indicates the presence of schizophrenia. Id. at 500. A plethora of
additional MMPI scales has evolved over the years; however, many of these have not
been adequately validated. Butcher & Tellegen, supra, at 622.
159. Rodgers, in SEVENTH MMY, supra note 118, § 104, at 244; see J. ZISKIN, supra
note 12, at 160. Rodgers adds: "[The MMPI] is most useful to supplement rather than
to replace information obtained by interview or clinical observation." Rodgers, in
SEVENTH MMY, supra note 118, § 104, at 244. See pp. 582-88 infra.
160. A. ANASTASi, supra note 120, at 520-21; J. WIGGINS, PERSONALITY AND
PREDICTION: PRINCIPLES OF PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT 423-25 (1973); J. ZISKIN, supra
note 12, at 160.
161. A. ANASTASI, supra note 120, at 515-17; J. WIGGINS, supra note 160, at 420-23;
J. ZISKIN, supra note 12, at 160.
162. A. ANASTASI, supra note 120, at 515-17, 520-21; J. WIGGINS, supra note 160, at
420-25; J. ZISKIN, supra note 12, at 160. A "response set" is a predisposition to
respond on a basis other than the person's personality.
163. A. ANASTASI, supra note 120, at 503.
164. Id.
19791
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
searcher, 165 and most reviewers agree that its effective use and interpreta-
tion requires a considerable degree of sophistication and experience.
166
Projective Techniques. These clinical instruments may be distin-
guished from non-projective tests insofar as they require a greater degree of
clinical judgment in their use and interpretation. 167 They consist *of
unstructured tasks designed to encourage the free play of the individual's
fantasy; thus, the test stimuli are intentionally vague or ambiguous.
168
Examples of such instruments are the Rorschach inkblots, 169 the Thematic
165. Rodgers, in SEVENTH MMY, supra note 118, § 104, at 250.
166. A. ANASTASI, supra note 120, at 504; Gynther, in SEVENTH MMY, supra note
118, § 104, at 242-43; Rodgers, in id. at 250; see note 159 supra. Increased use of
computerized MMPI scoring and interpretation systems promises to reduce the effects
of diagnostician bias. See J. ZISKIN, supra note 12, at 161-62; Eichman, in SEVENTH
MMY, supra note 118, § 105, at 250-52; Manning, Programmed Interpretation of the
MMPI, 35 J. PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT 162 (1971). But see, e.g., Butcher, in EIGHTH
MMY, supra note 118, §617, at 942.
167. A recent survey of clinical psychologists reveals that projective testing is the
most favored type of psychological testing. Wade & Baker, supra note 119, at 876
(Table 2), 880.
168. Anastasi explains:
The underlying hypothesis is that the way in which the individual perceives
and interprets the test material, or "structures" the situation, will reflect
fundamental aspects of his psychological functioning. In other words, it is
expected that the test materials will serve as a sort of screen on which the
respondent "projects" his characteristic thought processes, needs, anxieties,
and conflicts.
A. ANASTASI, supra note 120, at 558-59.
169. Examinees are shown a series of ten inkblots on cards and asked to explain
what the blot could represent. Id. at 560. See United States v. McNeil, 434 F.2d 502,
505-09 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (per curiam) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring). The Rorschach is by
far one of the most popular psychological techniques, Wade & Baker, supra note 119,
at 876 (Table 2), and yet there is little evidence to support its reliability and validity,
see text accompanying notes 181 to 187 infra. For critical reviews of the literature
since 1959, see EIGHTH MMY, supra note 118, § 661, at 1040-45; SEVENTH MMY, supra
note 118, § 175; THE SIXTH MENTAL MEASUREMENTS YEARBOOK § 237 (0. Buros ed.
1965) [hereinafter cited as SIXTH MMY]. See generally HANDBOOK ON PROJECTIVE
TECHNIQUES 221-421 (B. Murstein ed. 1965) [hereinafter cited as PROJECTIVE
TECHNIQUES].
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Apperception Test (TAT),170 verbal techniques,17' and expressive tech-
niques.1
72
Most projective techniques appear to lack adequate standardization
with respect to both administration and scoring. 7 3 Even subtle differences
in the phrasing of verbal instructions and in examiner-subject relationships
can appreciably alter performance on these instruments.74 Factors such as
verbal ability, hunger, lack of sleep, drugs, anxiety, and frustration have
also been shown to affect test results.7 5 In short, projective technique
responses can be meaningfully interpreted only when the examiner has
extensive information about the circumstances under which they were
obtained and the aptitudes and experiential background of the examinee.17 6
The normative data for many projective instruments may be completely
170. The TAT, in contrast with the inkblot technique, presents more highly
structured stimuli and requires more complex and meaningful organized verbal
responses. A. ANASTASI, supra note 120, at 565. It consists of about eighteen cards
depicting ambiguous situations and one blank card. The examinee is asked to make
up a story to fit each picture telling what led up to the event shown, describing what
is happening at the moment and what the characters are feeling and thinking, and
giving the outcome. In the case of the blank card, the person is instructed to imagine
some picture on the card, describe it, and then tell a story about it. Id.
After the Rorschach, the TAT is the second most popular instrument among
clinical psychologists. Wade & Baker, supra note 119, at 876 (Table 2). Its reliability
and validity as a diagnostic tool has been challenged over the years, and a recent
review of the literature seriously questions its usefulness as an assessment technique
given its dubious reliability, validity, and standardization. See SWARTZ, in EIGHTH
MMY, supra note 118, § 697, at 1127-30. Its utility appears to be primarily limited to
differentiating groups (e.g., psychotic from neurotic) and not trait identification in
specific individuals. SEVENTH MMY, supra note 118, § 181; SixTH MMY, supra note
169, § 245. See generally PROJECTIVE TECHNIQUES, supra note 169, at 425-606.
171. Examples of this technique are word association and sentence completion
tests. See A. ANASTASI, supra note 120, at 569-71. See generally PROJECTIVE
TECHNIQUES, supra note 169, at 777-906.
172. An example of this technique is the Draw-A-Person (D-A-P) test in which
examinees are provided with paper and pencil and asked to draw a person. Upon
completion of that task, they are asked to draw a person of the sex opposite of that of
the first figure. A. ANASTASI, supra note 120, at 575. For critical reviews of the
reliability and validity of this projective test, see Adler, Evaluation of the Figure
Drawing Technique: Reliability, Factorial Structure, and Diagnostic Usefulness, 35 J.
CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 52, 56-57 (1970); Dmitruk, Situational Variables
and Performance on Machover's Figure-Drawing Test, 35 PERCEPTUAL & MOTOR
SKILLS 489-490 (1972); Harris, in SEVENTH MMY, supra note 118, § 165, at 401-04;
Kokonis, Choice of Gender on the DAP and Measures of Sex-Role Identification, 35
PERCEPTUAL & MOTOR SKILLS 727 (1972); Roback, Human Figure Drawings: Their
Utility in the Clinical Psychologist's Armamentarium for Personality Assessment, 70
PSYCHOL. BULL. 1, 16-17 (1968) (review of literature); Swensen, Empirical Evaluations
of Human Figure Drawings: 1957-1966, 70 PSYCHOL. BULL. 20, 40 (1968). See
generally PROJECTIVE TECHNIQUES, supra note 169, at 609-99.
173. A. ANASTASI, supra note 120, at 578. See Dana, in EIGHTH MMY, supra note
118, § 661, at 1040-42 (Rorschach); Peterson, in id. at 1042-45 (Rorschach).
174. A. ANASTASI, supra note 120, at 578.
175. Id. at 584.
176. Id.
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lacking, grossly inadequate, or based on vaguely described populations. 177
There is also a distinct lack of objectivity in the evaluation of projective
instruments, 78 and clinicians tend to rely solely on their "general clinical
experience" to interpret test results. 179 Such experience is almost certain to
produce a distorted picture because clinical psychologists deal primarily
with mentally disordered individuals: the clinician may lack sufficient
firsthand familiarity with the characteristic reactions of normal people.1"
Because of the relatively unstandardized scoring procedures and the
paucity of normative data, scorer reliability becomes an important
consideration in projective testing.181 Interpretative scorer reliability is the
extent to which different examiners attribute the same personality
characteristics to the examinee on the basis of their interpretation of an
identical record. 8 2 Few adequate studies have been conducted regarding the
scorer reliability of projective techniques. 83 Research has revealed remark-
able divergence in the interpretations given by reasonably well qualified
test users. 8 4 Attempts to measure other types of projective test reliability,
for example, internal consistency and retest reliability, have fared equally
poorly.158 Furthermore, the large majority of published validation studies on
projective techniques is inconclusive at best, 8 and those studies that have
177. Id. at 578. Also, interpretation of projective test performance often involves
subgroup norms that the clinician must derive on the basis of clinical experience or
published data. Unless these subgroups are correlated in terms of age or education, for
example, these norms may lead to faulty interpretations. Id. at 579.
178. With the Rorschach, for example, there are a number of situational factors
that may significantly influence the psychologist's assessment procedure. Dana, in
EIGHTH MMY, supra note 118, §661, at 1041-42; Peterson, in id. at 1044.
179. Wade & Baker, supra note 119, at 879-80. The authors observed that the
clinical psychologists in their survey were clearly indifferent to the importance of
reliability and validity in test selection or use, and that they were more inclined to
accept their personal hypotheses over test results if the two were in conflict. Id.
Reliance upon clinical experience tends to increase the ambiguity of the
examiner's interpretations of the subject's responses. A. ANASTASI, supra note 120, at
584. Anastasi remarks:
[Plerhaps the most disturbing implication is that the interpretation of scores
is often as projective for the examiner as the test stimuli are for the examinee.
In other words, the final interpretation of projective test responses may reveal
more about the theoretical orientation, favorite hypotheses, and personality
idiosyncracies of the examiner than it does about the examinee's personality
dynamics.
Id. at 578. Even when objective scoring systems are available, an overwhelming
majority of clinicians indicated that they would still evaluate test results according to
their personal or clinical hypotheses or opinions. Wade & Baker, supra note 119, at
875-76.
180. A. ANASTASI, supra note 120, at 578.
181. Id. Wade and Baker's survey revealed that 81.5% of the clinical psychologists
responding preferred to use personalized procedures to evaluate the results of
projective tests. Wade & Baker, supra note 119, at 876.
182. A. ANASTASI, supra note 120, at 578.
183. Id.
184, Id.
185. Id. at 579-80.
186. Id. at 581.
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been designed to avoid all the major pitfalls of projective technique
validation generally conclude that the validity of these instruments is either
zero or very low.
1 87
As psychometric instruments, projective techniques have been criticized
on several grounds: they are founded upon a questionable theoretical
rationale; there is ample evidence that alternative explanations may
account as well or better for the individual's responses to unstructured test
stimuli; 8 8 and projective techniques are inadequate when evaluated in
accordance with test standards. 8 9 Thus, it would seem more appropriate to
limit their use to that of a supplementary, qualitative interviewing aid for
the skilled clinician. 19
It is frequently asserted that criticism of psychological tests individually
is inappropriate, since they are usually administered in conjunction with
other instruments, the implication being that the accuracy of the entire test
battery transcends the limited reliability and validity of its parts.19 ' The
available evidence suggests that this assumption may be unfounded, at least
with respect to certain batteries of tests, and that such test batteries may
actually be less reliable and valid than their component parts.
9 2
The continued popularity of psychological testing among clinicians
despite all the negative data available concerning test accuracy remains a
mystery. One recent study of psychological test usage hypothesizes that
many clinicians are indifferent to such negative research because their
187. Id. at 583-84; Little, Problems in the Validation of Projective Techniques, in
PROJECTIVE TECHNIQUES, supra note 169, at 78. See Dana, in EIGHTH MMY, supra
note 118, §661, at 1040-42 (Rorschach); Peterson, in id. at 1042-45 (Rorschach);
Swartz, in id. § 697, at 1127-30 (TAT).
188. A. ANASTASI, supra note 120, at 585.
189. Id. Anastasi has observed that there is an impressive collection of studies that
have failed to demonstrate any validity for such projective techniques as the
Rorschach and D-A-P techniques.
190. Id. at 586. Regarding projective techniques, Anastasi has concluded: "Their
value as clinical tools is proportional to the skill of the clinician and hence cannot be
assessed independently of the individual clinician using them." Id. It is unclear,
however, whether clinical experience necessarily leads to greater diagnostic skill. See
p. 586 infra.
191. E.g., McCreary, Training Psychology and Law Students to Work Together, 8
PROF. PSYCHOL. 103, 108 (1977).
192. Goldberg, The Effectiveness of Clinicians' Judgments: The Diagnosis of
Organic Brain Damage From the Bender-Gestalt Test, 23 J. CONSULTING PSYCHOL. 25
(1959); Wildman & Wildman, An Investigation into the Comparative Validity of
Several Diagnostic Tests and Test Batteries, 31 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 455 (1975); cf.
Golden, Some Effects of Combining Psychological Tests on Clinical Inferences, 28 J.
CONSULTING PSYCHOL. 440, 444 (1964) (reliability and validity of test battery
including Rorschach, TAT, and MMPI did not increase as a function of number of
tests). In the Wildman and Wildman study, none of several combinations of four
popular psychometric instruments significantly improved the accuracy of prediction.
In fact, the accuracy rate for some of them decreased when they were combined to
form a test battery. No test battery will eliminate the effects of examiner-subject
interactions or interpretive bias, and combinations of tests may provide even more
opportunities for these factors to operate. J. ZISKIN, supra note 12, at 180 n.56. See pp.
582-87 infra.
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opinions of a test's value are derived principally from their personal
experience with the test.193 Although poor reliability and validity were
recognized as distinct disadvantages of psychological tests, those character-
istics were not considered particularly important in test-use decisions. 94
This approach to testing maximizes the clinician's susceptibility to "illusory
correlations" - pervasive subjective biases. 195
2. Accuracy of Psychological Diagnoses
Much of the confusion over diagnosis may be attributed to the
ambiguities inherent in the psychological nomenclature. The standard
lexicon for both psychology and psychiatry is the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-I1)' 96 published by the American
193. Wade & Baker, supra note 119, at 879.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 879, 881. See text accompanying notes 225 to 228 infra.
196. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DSM-II: DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (2d ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as DSM-II]. The
foreward of DSM-II cryptically states:
In the case of diagnostic categories about which there is current controversy
concerning the disorder's nature or cause, the Committee has attempted to
select terms which it thought would least bind the judgment of the user. The
Committee itself included representatives of many views. It did not try to
reconcile those views but rather to find terms which could be used to label the
disorders about which they wished to be able to debate.
Gruenberg, Foreward to id. at viii-ix (emphasis added). Contrary to the wishes of the
Committee on Nomenclature and Statistics, the publication and widespread use of
such a standardized nomenclature arguably curtails debate over the meaning of these
ambiguous labels and provides them with a semblance of precision. The fact that the
DSM-II offers an integrated classification scheme of behavioral disorders, in contrast
with prior diagnostic systems, should not be interpreted to mean that there is
substantial agreement about the nosology. See, e.g., Conover, Psychiatric Distinc-
tions: New and Old Approaches, 13 J. HEALTH & Soc. BEHAVIOR 167 (1972) (review of
literature); Jackson, The Revised Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of the American
Psychiatric Association, 127 AM. J. PSYCHIA. 65, 69-71 (1970); Taylor & Heiser,
Phenomenology: An Alternative Approach to Diagnosis of Mental Disease, 12
COMPREHENSIVE PSYCHIA. 480 (1971); Zubin, Classification of the Behavior Disorders,
18 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 373 (1967).
A number of other potential sources of diagnostic disagreement among
clinicians using the DSM-II nomenclature have also been identified, including subject
variance, occasion variance, information variance, observation variance, and
criterion variance. Spitzer, Endicott & Robins, Clinical Criteria for Psychiatric
Diagnosis and DSM-III, 132 AM. J. PSYCHIA. 1187, 1187-88 (1975). One study
concluded that the DSMII nosology is not a true specialist language and suggested
that "everyday lay language would offer at least as structured, as reliable and as
public a set of terms for describing human behaviour and psychological characteris-
tics." Agnew & Bannister, Psychiatric Diagnosis as a Pseudo-Specialist Language, 46
BRIT. J. MED. PSYCHOL. 69, 73 (1973).
The DSM-II is the product of the American Psychiatric Association's (APA)
Committee on Nonmenclature and Statistics, members of the APA, consultants, and
comments based on field testing. An interesting exception to this process was the
elimination several years ago of one DSM-II diagnostic category, homosexuality, in
an extraordinarily unscientific and subjective manner. In December 1973 the trustees
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Psychiatric Association. Although the following critique of this diagnostic
nomenclature is derived primarily from materials and commentary authored
by psychiatrists, the criticisms they raise are equally applicable to
psychologists who use the DSM-II for diagnostic purposes.
The standards of reliability and validity used to judge the accuracy of
psychological testing are equally applicable to classification systems such
as a diagnostic nomenclature. Reliability in this context refers to the
consistency with which subjects may be classified. 97 Validity refers to the
utility of the system for its various purposes.198 Another way to view
reliability and validity is to think of the former as referring to the degree of
correlation or correspondence of judgment between professionals using the
same method and the latter as referring to the degree of correlation or
correspondence between the judgment reached by professionals and some
fact in the external world.199 For psychological diagnosis, the purposes of a
nomenclature are communication about clinical features, etiology, course of
illness, and treatment. It has been observed: "A necessary constraint on the
validity of a system is its reliability. There is no guarantee that a reliable
system is valid, but assuredly an unreliable system must be invalid."" The
reliability and validity of psychological judgments are examined separately
below.
(a) Reliability of Psychological Diagnoses
Studies of the reliability of psychological diagnoses are rare; however, a
number have been conducted regarding psychiatric diagnoses. In a review of
six major studies of the reliability of psychiatric diagnosis conducted
of the APA voted to discontinue the classification of homosexuality as a mental
disorder. The resulting furor led to a referendum vote by the entire membership of
20,000 on April 8, 1974. The tabulated results were 5,854 in favor of the trustees'
position, 3,810 against, and 367 abstentions, with 41% of the membership not voting.
N.Y. Times, April 9, 1974, at 12, col. 4. For the documents implementing this decision,
see READINGS, supra note 52, at 71-73. The debate over the exclusion of homosexual-
ity from the DSM-II continues, and its strong political, as opposed to scientific,
overtones have been widely recognized. See Saltonstall, Psyching Out Homosexual-
ity, Wash. Post, Dec. 18, 1977, at Cl, col. 3. A subsequent survey of 2,500 psychiatrists
has revealed that 69% of them agreed that homosexuality was a pathological
adaptation to normal sexual development and not medically normal. Id. at C2, col. 3.
This unscientific majority vote procedure extends to the adoption of the other DSM-H
categories as well. Zubin, supra, at 397.
197. Spitzer & Fleiss, A Re-analysis of the Reliability of Psychiatric Diagnosis, 125
BRIT. J. PSYCHIA. 341, 341 (1974).
198. Id.
199, Ennis & Litwack, supra note 12, at 697-98.
200. Spitzer & Fleiss, supra note 197, at 341. See Kreitman, The Reliability of
Psychiatric Diagnosis, 107 J. MENT. SCd. 876, 883-84 (1961). Helzer et al. have
observed: "If two psychiatrists operating within the same diagnostic framework
cannot agree, it is likely that at least one of the two is wrong. The more disagreement
there is, the greater the likelihood that any individual judgment is invalid." Helzer,
Robins, Taibleson, Woodruff, Reich & Wish, Reliability of Psychiatric Diagnosis: I. A
Methodological Review, 34 ARcH. GEN. PSYCHIA. 129, 129 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Helzer I].
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between 1956 and 1975, two researchers calculated interrater reliability,
correcting for chance agreement. Summarizing their results, they concluded:
There are no diagnostic categories for which reliability is uniformly
high. Reliability appears to be only satisfactory for three categories:
mental deficiency, organic brain syndrome (but not its subtypes), and
alcoholism. The level of reliability is no better than fair for psychosis
and schizophrenia and is poor for the remaining categories.2° 1
The authors also observed that in five of the six studies the diagnosticians
were of similar background, and in some instances, special efforts were
made to have the participants arrive at some consensus on diagnostic
principles prior to beginning the research - factors that should have
increased interrater reliability. Contrary to their expectations, however,
these elements did not significantly contribute to 'high reliability. They
theorized: "One can only assume ... that agreement between heterogeneous
diagnosticians of different orientations and backgrounds, as they act in
routine clinical settings, is even poorer than is indicated in this review." 20 2
Their study also revealed no essential change in diagnostic reliability over
time.20 3 The authors' conclusion was less than sanguine about the reliability
of psychiatric diagnoses:
The reliability of psychiatric diagnosis as it has been practised since
at least the late 1950's is not good. It is likely that the reasons for
diagnostic unreliabilityare the same now as when Beck et al. (1962)
studied them. They found that a significant amount of the variability
among diagnosticians was due to differences in how they elicited and
evaluated the necessary information, and that an even larger amount
was due to inherent weakness and ambiguities in the nomenclatureY
°4
201. Spitzer & Fleiss, supra note 197, at 344 (the major categories, excluding
subtypes, were mental deficiency, organic brain syndrome, alcoholism, psychosis,
affective disorder, personality disorder or neurosis [?], personality disorder, neurosis,
and psychophysiological reaction).
202. Id. Ennis and Litwack observed that studies of diagnostic reliability under
controlled conditions are more likely to produce higher rates of concordance than that
obtained in actual practice because the lack of controls in the latter situation
(inexperienced or incompetent psychiatrists, particularized interviewing techniques
and conditions, definitional ambiguities and biases, semantic differences, etc.)
contribute to lower diagnostic reliability. Ennis & Litwack, supra note 12, at 703-04.
203. Spitzer & Fleiss, supra note 197, at 344.
204. Id. at 345. See Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock & Erbaugh, Reliability of
Psychiatric Diagnoses: 2. A Study of Consistency of Clinical Judgments and Rates,
119 AM. J. PSYCHIA. 351, 356 (1962); note 205 and accompanying text infra. Spitzer
and Fleiss' observation that the inherent unreliability of psychiatric diagnosis may be
due to the weakness and ambiguities of the nomenclature has been echoed in
another study regarding sources of diagnostic disagreement. Ward et al. estimated
that over sixty percent of the disagreements and inconsistencies of diagnosis was
generated by the inadequacy of the nosological system with inconsistency on the part
of diagnosticians and patients accounting for thirty percent and five percent,
respectively. Ward, Beck, Mendelson, Mock & Erbaugh, The Psychiatric Nomencla-
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Overall interrater reliability for specific diagnoses ranges from 'about thirty-
two percent to sixty-three percent agreement, which means that psychia-
trists tend to disagree on specific diagnoses a significant percentage of the
time.205 To date, there are no studies that demonstrate that the rate of
agreement among psychologists is any better or worse than that of
psychiatrists. One danger arising from such a lack of reliability is that
patients may be inappropriately classified; these classifications may then
directly influence the type of treatment they receive.
2 6
Despite a salutary trend toward the creation of an empirically based
nomenclature, 2 7 the accuracy of psychological diagnoses based thereon may
ture: Reasons for Diagnostic Disagreement, 7 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIA. 198, 201 (1962).
Thus, clinical diagnoses may be far more reliable than thesc studies suggest.
205. Ash, The Reliability of Psychiatric Diagnoses, 44 J. ABNORM. & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 272, 276 (1949) (overall agreement rate for three psychiatrists was 20% for
specific diagnostic categories, 45.7% for major categories); Beck et al., supra note 204,
at 352, 354 (54% agreement on specific diagnoses, 70% agreement for major divisions
(i.e., neurosis, psychosis and character disorder)) (Beck et al. concluded: "It seems
apparent that the rate of agreement of 54% for the refined diagnostic categories is not
adequate for research. Moreover, it is questionable whether the rate of 70% for the
major divisions . . .would be considered adequate for research." Id. at 355.); Hunt,
Wittson & Hunt, A Theoretical and Practical Analysis of the Diagnostic Process, in
CURRENT PROBLEMS IN PSYCHIATRIC DIAGNOSIS 60 (P. Hoch & J. Zubin eds. 1953)
(54.1% agreement within broad categories, 32.6% agreement on specific categories);
Kreitman, Sainsbury, Morrissey, Towers & Scrivener, The Reliability of Psychiatric
Assessment: An Analysis, 107 J. MENT. Sci. 887, 903 (1961) (78% agreement on generic
diagnoses, 63% agreement on specific diagnoses); Sandifer, Hordern, Timbury &
Green, Psychiatric Diagnosis: A Comparative Study in North Carolina, London and
Glasgow, 114 BRIT. J. PSYCHIA. 1, 3-4 (1968) (58% agreement amongst American
psychiatrists based upon twelve major diagnostic categories); Schmidt & Fonda, The
Reliability of Psychiatric Diagnosis: A New Look, 52 J. ABNORM. &-Soc. PSYCHOL.
262, 265 (1956) (55% agreement on specific subtype, 84% agreement on major category).
See Bartholomew & Milte, The Reliability and Validity of Psychiatric Diagnoses in
Courts of Law, 50 AUST. L.J. 450 (1976); Spitzer & Fleiss, supra note 197.
206. Ennis & Litwack, supra note 12, at 707. Cf. Merriken v. Cressman, 364 F.
Supp. 913, 920 (E.D. Pa. 1973) ("When a program talks about labeling someone as a
particular type and such a label could remain with him for the remainder of his life,
the margin of error must be almost nil"). See note 139 supra.
207. The existing studies strongly suggest that an empirically based diagnostic
criterion is essential if interrater reliability is to be improved. Helzer, Clayton,
Pambakian, Reich, Woodruff & Reveley, Reliability of Psychiatric Diagnosis: II. The
Test/Retest Reliability of Diagnostic Classification, 34 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIA. 136, 136
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Helzer II]; Helzer I, supra note 200, at 132; Spitzer & Fleiss,
supra note 197, at 345-46; see Spitzer, More on Pseudoscience in Science and the Case
for Psychiatric Diagnosis, 33 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIA. 459, 466-68 (1976). Toward this
end, the American Psychiatric Association is in the process of revising the DSM-IL
See THE TASK FORCE ON NOMENCLATURE AND STATISTICS, AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC
ASSOCIATION, DSM-III DRAFr: DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS (3d ed., Jan. 15, 1978 Draft) [hereinafter cited as DSM-III]. See generally
Morse, supra note 3, at 543 n.26. The DSM-III will include the usual comprehensive
descriptions of categories as well as a new feature, specific diagnostic criteria that
must be met before a patient may be given a particular diagnosis. The use of such'
diagnostic criteria is intended "to reduce the number of instances in which a single
diagnostic label is used in vastly different ways by different mental health workers."
Spitzer, Foreward to DSM-III, supra, at vii. The DSM-III also drops the general
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still be suspect.2° s If the specific criteria for inclusion in a particular
diagnostic category remain too subjective, then their value as the basis for
an operational nomenclature may be significantly diminished.2° 9 For
example, if one element for inclusion in a diagnostic category is evidence of
memory impairment, the individual psychologist's concept of the degree of
impairment necessary for inclusion may vary widely. Second, patients with
a few, but not all, of the symptoms necessary for a particular diagnosis, or
who manifest symptoms that are not discrete but overlap significantly, may
category of neurosis and, in a controversial move, has added "tobacco withdrawal" as
a substance-induced mental disorder. Id. at A:75; NEWSWEEK, Jan. 8, 1979, at 68. For a
brief history of the DSM-III, see Schacht & Nathan, But Is It Good for the
Psychologists? Appraisal and Status of DSM-III, 32 Am. PSYCHOL. 1017, 1017-18
(1977).
The proposed DSM-III differs from the current DSM-II in two important
respects. First, rather than a general clinical description, the criteria for each category
would be precisely stated in terms of the symptoms required to establish a particular
diagnosis. Ideally, objectively identifiable symptoms, with definitions if necessary,
would be listed, and the minimum number of symptoms required to make an accurate
diagnosis indicated. Exclusion criteria could also be included. Second, the nomencla-
ture would include a residual category such as "undiagnosed psychiatric illness" for
those patients who did not meet any of the diagnostic criteria. Rules for assignment to
this category would be set forth in detail. The essential purpose of operationally based
diagnostic criteria is to facilitate communication and research between mental health
professionals by standardizing the classification system with reference to empirically
demonstrable phenomena. The shortcomings of the DSM-II in this regard have been
widely noted. The amorphous concept of schizophrenia, for example, illustrates the
difficulty of creating comprehensive definitions for mental disorders. See, e.g., J.
ZISKIN, supra note 12, at 112-16; Fitzgibbons & Shearn, Concepts of Schizophrenia
Among Mental Health Professionals: A Factor-Analytic Study, 38 J. CONSULTING &
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 288 (1972); Kubie, Multiple Fallacies in the Concept of Schizophre-
nia, 153 J. NERV. & MENT. Dis. 331 (1971); Rieder, The Origins of Our Confusion
About Schizophrenia, 37 PSYCHIA. 197 (1974) (historical overview); van Praag, About
The Impossible Concept of Schizophrenia, 17 COMPREHENSIVE PSYCHIA. 481 (1976).
Compare DSM-I, supra note 196, Schizophrenia, § 295, at 33-35 with DSM-III, supra,
at C:1 to C:15.
208. See Schacht & Nathan, supra note 207. The authors also object to the
apparent "medicalization" of psychological disorders in the DSM-III that would make
physicians paramount in the diagnosis and treatment of such disorders and
significantly encroach upon the domain of psychologists and other mental health
professionals. Id. at 1023-24. They fear that legislators and insurers may come to
view the treatment of mental disorders as a medical problem and require that they be
evaluated first by physicians, who will then decide whether they or ancillary mental
health professionals will treat the disorder. Id. For an alternative to the DSM-III
diagnostic schema designed especially for psychologists, see McLemore & Benjamin,
Whatever Happened to Interpersonal Diagnosis? A Psychological Alternative to
DSM-III, 34 Am. PSYCHOL. 17 (1979).
209. Helzer et al.'s study offers some evidence that the use of a structured
psychiatric interview technique in conjunction with operational diagnostic criteria
will improve interrater reliability for those categories of disorder for which specific
diagnostic criteria exist and which do not depend heavily upon interviewer judgment.
For example, criteria for what constitutes impairment of orientation and memory or
deterioration in mental functioning remain too subjective and are without a well-
defined operational criteria. Helzer 11, supra note 207, at 140.
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be placed - temporarily or permanently depending upon the combination of
symptoms observed - in the residual category of "undiagnosed psychiatric
illness." The implication is that an individual may be labeled mentally
disordered, albeit tentatively, even though a specific diagnostic category
does not exist. Such flexibility may lead to overinclusiveness. Finally,
depending on how carefully the symptom criteria are drafted, they still may
not account for the relative frequency of such behavior in "normal"
populations.1 0
(b) Validity of Psychological Diagnoses
In an article regarding the admissibility of psychiatric evidence in civil
commitment proceedings, two commentators observed that "most specific
diagnoses do not accurately describe even those symptoms perceived by the
examiner, to say nothing of the actual symptom exhibited by the patient. '211
This discrepancy may be significantly reduced with the advent of oper-
ational diagnostic criteria such as the DSM-III,212 but at least one review
of the literature has concluded that there is a lack of validity in the
classification of behavior under the present system and challenges its
usefulness for diagnosis. 213 Noting that "many clinicians are unable to
make better than chance judgments," another study concluded that we "can
no longer take for granted the validity of any clinician's judgment. '214 If the
validity of predictions of dangerousness by psychiatrists is any indication of
the validity of psychological judgments in general, the prognosis is poor.215
210. See text accompanying notes 228 to 229 infra.
211. Ennis & Litwack, supra note 12, at 709-10. See Nathan, Samaraweera,
Andberg & Patch, Syndromes of Psychosis and Psychoneurosis, A Clinical Validation
Study, 19 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIA. 704 (1968).
212. See note 207 supra.
213. Frank, Psychiatric Diagnosis: A Review of Research, 81 J. GEN. PSYCHOL.
157, 164 (1969).
214. Thorne, Clinical Judgment, in CLINICAL ASSESSMENT IN COUNSELING AND
PSYCHOTHERAPY 30-31 (R. Woody & J. Woody eds. 1972). See generally Ennis &
Litwack, supra note 12, at 708-11.
215. E.g., Ennis & Litwack, supra note 12, at 711-16; Morse, supra note 3, at 595;
Steadman & Cocozza, Psychiatry, Dangerousness and the Repetitively Violent
Offender, 69 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 226 (1978). Steadman and Cocozza, who
studied the accuracy of specific psychiatric predictions of dangerousness for a group
of indicted felony defendants found incompetent to stand trial, concluded: "These
data strongly suggest that under pretrial examination conditions psychiatrists show
no abilities to predict accurately future violent behavior beyond that expected by
chance. The primary criterion employed by the psychiatrists was the current alleged
offense rather than anything specifically psychiatric." Id. at 231. See Cocozza &
Steadman, The Failure of Psychiatric Predictions of Dangerousness: Clear and
Convincing Evidence, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 1084, 1098-99 (1976) ("The findings of this
study taken together with the other works reviewed in this paper would appear to
represent clear and convincing evidence of the inability of psychiatrists or anyone
else to predict dangerousness accurately."); Diamond, The Psychiatric Prediction of
Dangerousness, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 439, 451-52 (1974).
For a recent and thoughtful overview of the definitional and conceptual issues
associated with the term "dangerousness," see Shah, Dangerousness: A Paradigm for
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Diagnoses based upon the administration of various psychological tests
may be subject to error in cases in which the subject may have a reason to
exaggerate pathology. 216 Consequently, until adequate empirical data are
available, predictions by laypersons may be as accurate as "expert"
predictions. 217
3. Personal Bias and Psychological Judgments
Aside from commenting on the lack of accuracy of polygraph evidence,
the Alexander court observed that the technique may also be influenced by
the potential bias of the expert and extrinsic or otherwise uncontrollable
factors. A similar criticism is applicable to psychological expert testimony.
The effect of the clinical interaction on psychological judgments in both
experimental218 and clinical2 19 contexts is well documented. Perhaps the
most crucial factors influencing psychological diagnoses are the clinician's
own personality, value system, self-image, preferences, and attitudes. 20
Exploring Some Issues in Law and Psychology, 33 AM. PSYCHOL. 224 (1978). The
validity of psychiatric predictions of the need for hospitalization and treatment and
the effect of such treatment is equally dubious. Ennis & Litwack, supra note 12, at
717-19.
216. Heaton, Smith, Lehman & Vogt, Prospects for Faking Believable Deficits on
Neuropsychological Testing, 46 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 892, 898-900
(1978).
217. Morse, supra note 3, at 598.
218. E.g., R. ROSENTHAL, EXPERIMENTER EFFECTS IN BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH
(1966).
219. E.g., Thorne, supra note 214, at 30. Differences in interpretation in the clinical
context may be induced by external (i.e., environmental) and internal (i.e., examiner
or subject biases and examiner-subject interactions) factors. J. ZISKIN, supra note 12,
at 118.
220. Such factors as sex, race, socio-economic class, and personality characteristics
may significantly affect the administration of psychological tests. E.g., Arlett, Best &
Little, The Influence of Interviewer Self-Disclosure and Verbal Reinforcement on
Personality Tests, 32 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 770 (1976); Barnard, Interaction Effects
among Certain Experimenter and Subject Characteristics on a Projective Test, 32 J.
CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 514 (1968); Carkhuff & Pierce, Differential Effects
of Therapist Race and Social Class upon Patient Depth of Self-Exploration in the
Initial Clinical Interview, 31 J. CONSULTING PSYCHOL. 632 (1967); Gross, Herbert,
Knatterud & Donner, The Effect of Race and Sex on the Variation of Diagnosis and
Disposition in a Psychiatric Emergency Room, 148 J. NERV. & MENT. DIs. 638 (1969);
Koscherak & Masling, Noblesse Oblige Effect: The Interpretation of Rorschach
Responses as a Function of Ascribed Social Class, 39 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL
PSYCHOL. 415 (1972); Levy & Kahn, Interpreter Bias on the Rorschach Test as a
Function of Patients' Socioeconomic Status, 34 J. PROJECTIVE TECHNIQUES &
PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT 106 (1970); Masling, Role-Related Behavior of the Subject
and Psychologist and Its Effects upon Psychological Data, 14 NEB. SYMP.
MOTIVATION 67 (1966); Milner, Administrator's Gender and Sexual Content in
Projective Test Protocols, 31 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 540 (1975) (TAT test); Milner &
Moses, Effects of Administrator's Gender on Sexual Content and Productivity in the
Rorschach, 30 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 159 (1974); Milner & Moses, Sexual Responsivity
as a Function of Test Administrator's Gender, 39 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL
PSYCHOL. 515 (1972) (word association test); Stewart & Patterson, Eliciting Effects of
Verbal and Nonverbal Cues on Projective Test Responses, 41 J. CONSULTING &
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Psychologists may have a lower tolerance for abnormal behavior than
laypersons and interpret ambiguous behavior as disordered depending upon
their particular sensitivity to the apparent signs of psychopathology and
personal theoretical orientation.2 21 They may also be biased by the client's
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 74 (1973); Trachtman, Socio-Economic Class Bias in Rorschach
Disagnosis: Contributing Psychosocial Attributes of the Clinician, 35 J. PERSONALITY
ASSESSMENT 229 (1971).
A number of studies suggest that clinical judgment may be biased by the
physical attractiveness of the client as well as patient-clinician social class, race, sex
and personal Values. E.g., Abramowitz & Abramowitz, Should Prospective Women
Clients Seek Out Women Practitioners? Intimations of a "Ding-Bat" Effect in Clinical
Evaluation, 8 PROC. 81st ANN. CONVENTION AM. PSYCHOL. A. 503 (1973); Abramowitz,
Abramowitz, Jackson & Gomes, The Politics of Clinical Judgment: What Nonliberal
Examiners Infer about Women Who Do Not Stifle Themselves, 41 J. CONSULTING
PSYCHOL. 385 (1973); Abramowitz & Dokecki, The Politics of Clinical Judgment: Early
Empirical Returns, 84 PSYCHOL. BULL. 460 (1977) (review of literature); Broverman,
Broverman, Clarkson, Rosenkrantz & Vogel, Sex-Role Stereotypes and Clinical
Judgments of Mental Health, 34 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 1 (1970);
Broverman, Vogel, Broverman, Clarkson & Rosenkrantz, Sex-Role Stereotypes: A
Current Appraisal, 28 J. Soc. ISSUES 59, 69-71 (Spring 1972); Haan & Livson, Sex
Differences in the Eyes of Expert Personality Assessors: Blind Spots?, 37 J.
PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT 486 (1973); Hobfall & Penner, Effect of Physical
Attractiveness on Therapist's Initial Judgments of a Person's Self-concept, 46 J.
CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 200 (1978); Neulinger, Perceptions of the
Optimally Integrated Person: A Redefinition of Mental Health, 3 PROC. 76th ANN.
CONVENTION AM. PSYCHOL. A. 553 (1968). See also Allon, Sex, Race, Socio-Economic
Status, Social Mobility, and Process-Reactive Ratings of Schizophrenics, 153 J. NERV.
& MENT. Dis. 343 (1971); Dickes, Simons & Weisfogel, Difficulties in Diagnosis
Introduced by Unconscious Factors Present in the Interviewer, 44 PSYCHIA. Q. 55
(1970); Ennis & Litwack, supra note 12, at 726; Grosz & Grossman, The Sources of
Observer Variation and Bias in Clinical Judgments: 1. The Item of Psychiatric
History, 138 J. NERV. & MENT. DIS. 105, 111 (1964); Katz, Cole & Lowery, Studies of
the Diagnostic Process: The Influence of Symptom Perception, Past Experience, and.
Ethnic Background on Diagnostic Decisions, 125 Am. J. PSYCHIA. 937 (1969); Kubie,
The Ruby Case: Who or What was on Trial, 1 J. PSYCHIA. & L. 475, 486 (1973);
Mehlman, The Reliability of Psychiatric Diagnosis, 47 J. ABNORM. & SOC. PSYCHOL.
577 (1952); Pasamanick, Dinitz & Lefton, Psychiatric Orientation and Its Relation to
Diagnosis and Treatment in a Mental Hospital, 116 AM. J. PSYCHIA. 127 (1959); Pugh,
The Insanity Defense in Operation: A Practicing Psychiatrist Views Durham and
Brawner, 1973 WASH. U.L.Q. 87. One review of the literature concludes that patient
social class, and not race, sex, or personal values, has proven to be the only
significant biasing factor influencing clinical judgments. Abramowitz & Dokecki,
supra, at 473. Another recent study suggests that the emotional bearing of clients
during clinical interviews - whether they are angry, sad, or depressed, for example -
may affect a therapist's responses. Haccoun & Laviguer, Effects of Clinical
Experience and Client Emotion on Therapists' Responses, 47 J. CONSULTING &
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 416 (1979) (study revealed that therapists judged angry clients
less favorably than sad clients and that more experienced therapists showed greater
tolerance of anger; therapists intervened less with angry clients than with depressed
clients, and angry clients received less supportiveness, less directiveness, and fewer
requests for factual or emotional information).
221. J. ZISKIN, supra note 12, at 130-33. There is some evidence that psychologists,
in comparison with psychiatrists, may be more inclined to rate certain behavior as
abnormal. Copeland, Kelleher, Gourlay & Smith, Influence of Psychiatric Training,
Medical Qualification, and Paramedical Training on the Rating of Abnormal
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attitude toward the profession, especially if it is hostile.222 The self-fulfilling
prophecy phenomenon is another source of error because the subject may be
tacitly influenced by the expectations of the examiner.22 3 All of these
problems may be compounded when the diagnostic judgments of several
clinicians are discussed at clinical case conferences. 224
Three common errors plague clinical judgments by pyschologists. First,
clinicians may think they observe a relationship between a certain behavior
and a state, trait, process, or behavioral classification when in fact no such
relationship can be shown to exist.225 This persistent subjective bias
phenomenon is called "illusory correlation. ' 226 Although clinicians may
Behaviour, 5 PSYCHOL. MED. 89, 94 (1975) (study hypothesized that psychiatrists,
because they are most familiar with extremes of abnormal behavior, tended to
compare subjects With severely disordered patients in evaluating behavior and thus
were not as likely to view symptoms manifested as abnormal; in comparison, third
year psychology students tended to compare subjects' behavior with their own
concepts of normalcy, revealing a greater propensity for rating certain behavior as
abnormal). See Wing, Henderson & Winckle, The Rating of Symptoms by a
Psychiatrist and a Non-Psychiatrist: A Study of Patients Referred from General
Practice, 7 PSYCHOL. MED. 713, 714 (1977). See also Brown, Lawyer and Psychiatrists
in Court: Afterword, 32 MD. L. REV. 36, 39 (1972). One study indicates that these
factors operating in the context of a psychiatric hospital make it impossible for
mental health personnel to distinguish the sane from the insane. Rosenhan, On Being
Sane in Insane Places, 179 ScI. 250 (1973). See note 239 infra.
222. Braginsky & Braginsky, Psychologist: High Priests of the Middle Class, 7
PSYCHOL. TODAY, Dec. 1973, at 139; Wallach & Strupp, Psychotherapists' Clinical
Judgments and Attitudes Towards Patients, 24 J. CONSULTING PSYCHOL. 316 (1960).
223. J. ZISKIN, supra note 12, at 129; Felton, The Experimenter Expectancy Effect
Examined as a Function of Task Ambiguity and Internal-external Control, 5 J.
EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH PERSONALITY 286 (1971); Hersen & Greaves, Rorschach
Productivity as Related to Verbal Reinforcement, 35 J. PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT 436
(1971); Temerlin & Trousdale, The Social Psychology of Clinical Diagnosis, 6
PSYCHOTHERAPY: THEORY, RESEARCH & PRAc. 24 (1969).
224. P. MEEHL, Why I Do Not Attend Case Conferences, in PSYCHODIAGNOSIS:
SELECTED PAPERS 225 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Case Conferences]. Meehl's
engaging critique of clinical case conferences highlights the illogical thinking that
frequently characterizes such meetings.
225. Such persuasive subjective biases may also influence clinicians' psychological
test-use decisions. Wade & Baker, supra note 119, at 879-80.
226. Chapman & Chapman, Genesis of Popular but Erroneous Psychodiagnostic
Observations, 72 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 193 (1967). The Chapmans conclude:
It ... seems likely that in clinical practice the observer is reinforced in his
observations of illusory correlates by the reports of his fellow clinicians who
themselves are subject to the same illusions. Such consensual validation,
especially among experts, is usually regarded as evidence of the validity of
observation.
... The present findings indicate that illusory correlates reported by
clinicians do not reflect personal defects as much as difficulties inherent in
the clinician's task.
Id. at 203-04. See generally Chapman & Chapman, The Basis of Illusory Correlation,
84 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 574 (1975); Chapman & Chapman, Illusory Correlation as
an Obstacle to the Use of Valid Psychodiagnostic Signs, 74 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL.
271 (1969); Rosen, On the Persistence of Illusory Correlations Associated with the
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base their opinions on some behavior that in their own experience they
consider to be rare in the normal population, the actual frequency of any
particular behavior in the general population may not have been empirically
determined. 227 It is not surprising that most psychologists, by virtue of their
professional interest, tend to have limited contact or experience with
"normal" populations.228 Second, the clinician's personal ideology of
adjustment, health, social role, and even religious and political beliefs and
values may be correlated with freedom from a mental disorder so that a
person who does not fit the psychologist's "healthy" stereotype is likely to be
diagnosed as mentally disordered. This phenomenon has been termed the
"sick-sick fallacy. '229 Third, people are inclined to accept vague statements
about their own personalities as highly accurate interpretations when they
are made by a psychologist, despite the fact that such statements would be
equally true for a broad segment of the population. This fallacy is called the
"Barnum effect." 230 Arguably, this effect may extend to the statements
about the personalities of others made by psychological experts to the trier
of fact and may result in unfair prejudice. 22 1
Rorschach, 84 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 571 (1975). Although these studies regarding
illusory correlation focus on psychological testing, this concept may also be extended
to psychological judgments in general. See Golding & Rorer, Illusory Correlation and
Subjective Judgment, 80 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 249 (1972). Training specifically
intended to eliminate or reduce the effects of such bias may be of limited value. Kurtz
& Garfield, Illusory Correlation: A Further Exploration of Chapman's Paradigm, 46 J.
CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 1009 (1978).
227. Cf. Henn, Herjanic & Vanderpearl, Forensic Psychiatry: Diagnosis and
Criminal Responsibility, 162 J. NERV. & MENT. Dis. 423, 427 (1976) ("[T]he prevalence
of mental illness among violent criminal offenders and the general population is
roughly comparable, with mental illness in fact being found somewhat less among
offenders than in the general population.").
228. J. ZISKIN, supra note 12, at 52.
229. Case Conferences, supra note 224, at 237. The biasing effect of theoretical
orientation is particularly pronounced in the diagnosis and treatment of schizophre-
nia. Fitzgibbons & Shearn, supra note 207.
230. P. MEEHL, Wanted - A Good Cookbook, in PSYCHODIAGNOSIS: SELECTED
PAPERS 63 (1973). The term "Barnum effect" was first coined by Meehl, id. at 69, and
is derived from the name of the famous showman, P. T. Barnum, whose circus
attractions were noted for providing "a little something for everybody." Snyder,
Shenkel & Lowery, Acceptance of Personality Interpretations: The "Barnum Effect"
and Beyond, 45 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 104, 104 (1977).
The following are examples of such statements: "You have a great need for
other people to like you and admire you." "While you have some personality
weaknesses, you are generally able to compensate for them." "You pride yourself as
being an independent thinker and do not accept others' statements without
satisfactory proof." Snyder, Shenkel & Lowery, supra, at 106. All of these statements
are more likely to be true than not about a majority of people. In psychology, such
descriptions as "The patient is suffering from 'intrapsychic conflicts,' 'ambivalent
object relations,' 'sexual inhibitions,' or 'damaged self-image'" are similarly
equivocal. Case Conferences, supra note 224, at 237. These statements are analogous
to those found in horoscopes. Compare Snyder, Shenkel & Lowery, supra, with
Snyder, Why Horoscopes are True: The Effects of Specificity on Acceptance of
Astrological Interpretations, 30 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 577 (1974).
231. See p. 596 infra.
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In connection with the "sick-sick fallacy," there is some evidence that
psychologists have a greater tendency than do laypersons to perceive
mental disorders and symptoms in ambiguous behavior.2 32 Furthermore,
evidence exists that psychological judgments may be influenced by different
schools of thought and training.2 33 The literature also suggests that there
may be little correlation between the amount of clinical training and
experience in psychology and the degree of accuracy in clinical judg-
ments.234 One explanation for this phenomenon is that adequate review to
correct erroneous diagnoses rarely occurs during the course of psychological
evaluation.235 Psychologists, whose individual judgments may be more
reliable and valid than that of their colleagues, typically have not evaluated
their own accuracy unless they have maintained a detailed record of their
clients' progress and an independent, objective standard is used to evaluate
the diagnoses. A number of other psychological studies indicate that the
psychological judgments of experienced clinicians may not be superior to
those of novices or even laypersons.236 Also, there is evidence that the
232. See note 221 supra.
233. J. ZISKIN, supra note 12, at 128-29; Ennis & Litwack, supra note 12, at 721 &
n.91. See also Saghir, A Comparison of Some Aspects of Structured and Unstructured
Psychiatric Interviews, 128 AM. J. PSYCHIA. 180 (1971).
234. J. WIGGINS, supra note 160, at 131-34; Goldberg, The Effectiveness of
Clinicians' Judgments: The Diagnosis of Organic Brain Damage from the Bender-
Gestalt Test, 23 J. CONSULTING PSYCHOL. 25 (1959); Hiler & Nesvig, An Evaluation of
Criteria Used by Clinicians to Infer Pathology from Figure Drawings, 29 J.
CONSULTING PSYCHOL. 520 (1965); Luft, Implicit Hypotheses and Clinical Predictions,
45 J. ABNORMAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 756 (1950); Oskamp, The Relationship of Clinical
Experience and Training Methods to Several Criteria of Clinical Prediction, 76
PSYCHOL. MONOGRAPHS (No. 28, Whole No. 547) (1962); Schinka & Sines, Correlates of
Accuracy in Personality Assessment, 30 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 374 (1974).
235. J. ZISKIN, supra note 12, at 215. In Wade and Baker's study of psychological
test usage, only 20.6% of the clinical psychologists responding indicated that they
systematically collected and analyzed data regarding their own testing practices.
Wade & Baker, supra note 119, at 878. See Graham, Feedback and Accuracy of
Clinical Judgments from the MMPI, 36 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 286
(1971).
236. J. ZISKIN, supra note 12, at 217-18; Blankenhorn & Cerbus, Clinical and
"Actuarial" Evaluation of Organic Brain Damage by Psychologists and Non-
Psychologists Using the Memory-for-Designs, 40 PERCEPTUAL & MOTOR SKILLS 99
(1975) (no statistically significant differences in diagnostic accuracy of brain damage
versus no brain damage on Memory-for-Designs test between psychologists and non-
psychologists; no difference between clinical and objective evaluations of designs by
judges of both groups regardless of amount of experience of members of psychologist
group); Goldberg, Simple Models or Simple Processes? Some Research on Clinical
Judgments, 23 AM. PSYCHOL. 483 (1968) (review of literature regarding clinical
judgments concludes that amount of professional training and experience of judge
does not relate to judgmental accuracy; amount of information available to judge is
not related to accuracy of resulting inferences; such predictions are of low validity on
an absolute basis); Goldberg, supra note 234 (results of Bender-Gestalt test given to
experienced psychologists, psychological trainees and non-psychologists (hospital
secretaries) to distinguish brain damaged patients from normals; study revealed no
practical differences between groups in terms of accuracy); Goldberg & Werts, The
Reliability of Clinicians' Judgments: A Multitrait-Multimethod Approach, 30 J.
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diagnosis of mental disorders may be significantly influenced by the
subject's socio-economic background to the extent that diagnostic judgments
may differ depending upon the individual's history. 3 7 Similarly, the race
and sex of the patient may affect the ultimate diagnosis. 238
4. Context and Timing of the Clinical Interview
Such factors as the setting in which a subject is observed, the
appearance of the subject, and the expectations of the psychologist may
CONSULTING PSYCHOL. 199 (1966); Goldstein, Deysach & Kleinknecht, Effect of
Experience and Amount of Information on Identification of Cerebral Impairment, 41
J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 30 (1973) (study concludes that validated
actuarial approach to assessment of physical impairment of brain is more accurate
than clinical judgments of experienced psychologists even when test instrument was
interpreted by inexperienced clinicians); Luft, supra note 234 (predictions by
psychiatrists, social workers, advanced clinical psychologist trainees, and physical
scientists (primarily physicists and some meteorologists) based upon diagnostic
interview resulted in finding that no single group of judges was consistently superior;
in one case scores of non-clinicians on objective prediction test were significantly
higher); Oskamp, supra note 234 (experienced clinical psychologists demonstrated
only small degree of superiority in terms of accuracy over inexperienced undergradu-
ate psychology majors despite fact that prediction task involved apparently simple
discrimination between two extreme groups using MMPI profiles); Plaut & Crannell,
The Ability of Clinical Psychologists to Discriminate between Drawings by
Deteriorated Schizophrenics and Drawings by Normal Subjects, 1 PSYCHOL. REP. 153
(1955) (small sample of college students and nonclinical faculty members were
approximately as good as qualified clinical psychologists in discriminating drawings
by schizophrenics with probable intellectual deterioration and normal control group);
Sattler & Ryan, Scoring Agreement on the Stanford-Binet, 29 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOL.
35 (1973) (scoring accuracy of psychologists with doctoral degree and mean of 9.37
years of postdoctoral experience was similar to that of minimally trained group of
graduate students and untrained group of graduate students); Soskin, Bias in
Postdiction from Projective Tests, 49 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 69 (1954)
(experienced users of projective tests did not earn postdiction accuracy scores
significantly different from those of novices nor did accuracy of novices improve
significantly after completion of their training); Taft, The Ability to Judge People, 52
PSYCHOL. BULL. 1, 10-12 (1955) (review of studies conclude that non-psychologists (at
least physical scientists and personnel workers) may be more capable of judging
others accurately than are either psychology students or clinical psychologists);
Walker & Linden, Varying Degrees of Psychological Sophistication in the Interpreta-
tion of Sentence Completion Data, 23 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 229 (1967) (experienced
psychologists with doctoral degrees were not necessarily more consistent or accurate
than graduate and undergraduate students in psychology and undergraduate
engineering students in drawing conclusions based upon completion test data).
237. Graff, Kenig & Radoff, Prejudice of Upper Class Therapists Against Lower
Class Patients, 45 PSYCHIA. Q. 475 (1971); Katz, Cole & Lowery, supra note 220; Lee &
Temerlin, Social Class, Diagnosis, and Prognosis for Psychotherapy, 7
PSYCHOTHERAPY: THEORY, RESEARCH & PRAC. 181 (1970); Phillips & Draguns,
Classifications of the Behavior Disorders, 22 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 447, 467 (1971);
Routh & King, Social Class Bias in Clinical Judgment, 38 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL
PSYCHOL. 202 (1972); Stein, Green & Stone, Therapist Attitudes as Influenced by A-B
Therapist Type, Patient Diagnosis, and Social Class, 39 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL
PSYCHOL. 301 (1972).
238. See note 220 supra.
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distort clinical perception and ultimately influence the diagnosis. At least
one researcher has hypothesized that the examination of persons in mental
hospitals may predispose mental health professionals to detect pathological
behavior despite a relatively unremarkable life history and "normal"
behavior following admission to the institution. 2 9 There may be many
possible explanations for the observation of "hostile" behavior during the
course of a clinical interview. For example, the subject may be truly hostile
as a result of a mental disorder, or the psychologist or the setting for the
interview may have provoked such a response. Also, the hostility observed
by the psychologist may be the result of a predisposition toward noticing
that particular type of behavior to the exclusion of other less remarkable,
and even "normal," behaviors. 240
Another problem is that the behavior presented by a patient may not be
uniform over time, and unless an adequate sample of behavior is observed,
the resultant diagnosis will be of limited validity. One researcher concludes
that the consistency over time of specific diagnoses of nonorganic
conditions is quite low. 241 Thus, the subject may display consistent behavior
over time but different aspects of this behavior may be observed at different
times.24 2 Another related explanation might be that the relative importance
of the behaviors observed simply may have been interpreted differently at
various historical times - the diagnosis itself may be related to the
particular historical period in which it was made.
243
5. Education, Licensure, and Experience of Psychologists
State licensure alone does not necessarily assure competency.
244
Depending upon the jurisdiction, applicants may be required to meet
minimal educational or experiential requirements, and a doctoral, or at least
239. Rosenhan, supra note 221. Rosenhan concluded:
It is clear that we cannot distinguish the sane from the insane in
psychiatric hospitals. The hospital itself imposes a special environment in
which the meanings of behavior can easily be misunderstood. The conse-
quences to patients hospitalized in such an environment - the powerlessness,
depersonalization, segregation, mortification, and self-labeling - seem
undoubtedly countertherapeutic.
Id. at 257. See J. ZISKIN, supra note 12, at 130-33. Rosenhan's study has been severely
criticized on the grounds that the unreliability and uselessness of any diagnostic
method cannot be established by showing that insanity can be feigned and that
psychiatrists are not able to accurately diagnose pseudopatients as opposed to those
who are really meritally disordered. Farber, Sane and Insane: Constructions and
Misconstructions, 84 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 589 (1975); Spitzer, supra note 207.
240. J. ZISKIN, supra note 12, at 120. See text accompanying notes 218 to 224 supra.
241. Zubin, supra note 196, at 386. See Ennis & Litwack, supra note 12, at 724 &
n.103.
242. Ennis & Litwack, supra note 12, at 724.
243. Blum, On Changes in Psychiatric Diagnosis Over Time, 33 AM. PsYCHOL.
1017 (1978).
244. See Gross, The Myth of Professional Licensing, 33 AM. PSYCHOL. 1009,
1013-15 (1978).
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a master's, degree is usually required for certification. 245 In some states,
psychologists without any formal advanced education or those who have
received their postgraduate degrees from institutions not accredited by the
American Psychological Association may be licensed under grandfather
clauses. 246 With respect to the psychologist's expertise based upon clinicial
experience, there is a significant body of literature that has failed to
demonstrate a relationship between the amount of clinical training and
experience and the level of accuracy in clinical judgments. 247
In summary, the scientific literature regarding the accuracy of
psychological techniques and diagnoses suggests that they are highly
suspect and susceptible to a variety of significant sources of error.
Psychological tests may have limited reliability and validity even in the
hands of the most skilled clinician, and the interpretation of data derived
from clinical examinations frequently results in divergent opinions largely
due to the subjectivity of the evaluation process. As expert witnesses who
are permitted to diagnose mental disorders and to express an opinion about
their causal connection with the issue of ultimate fact, psychologists may
have limited empirically validated expertise to offer the legal system. Even
if the trier of law concludes that psychological evidence and judgments are
reasonably accurate, they may still be excluded in light of the various
evidentiary counterweights.
B. Evidentiary Counterweights and the Exclusion of Logically Relevant
Psychological Evidence and Expert Testimony
Assuming that psychological evidence meets the Frye test as currently
interpreted by the federal courts and is therefore relevant, it may be
inadmissible because of one or more of the various evidentiary counter-
weights. It has been observed that scientific theories and techniques tend to
create the unfounded impression of infallibility in the minds of layper-
sons. 248 Consequently, the courts may reasonably exclude such evidence on
245. E.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, §§629(4)-(5) (Cum. Supp. 1979). The statute
provides that applicants for certification must have received a "doctoral degree based
on a program of studies whose content was primarily psychological from an
accredited educational institution having an appropriate graduate program, or a
program of studies judged by the Board to be equivalent in both subject matter and
extent of training," id. § 629(4), and have at least two years of professional experience
in psychology. See generally Hess, supra note 76, at 366; Morse, supra note 3, at 533
n.12.
246. E.g., Berger v. Board of Psychologist Examiners, 521 F.2d 1056 (D.C. Cir.
1975); Whittle v. State Bd. of Examiners of Psychologists, 483 P.2d 328 (Okla. 1971);
D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 2-487 (West Cum. Supp. 1979). See generally Smith, Psychology
and the Courts: Some Implications of Recent Judicial Decisions for State Licensing
Boards, 9 PROF. PSYCHOL. 489, 489-95 (1978).
247. See text accompanying notes 234 to 236 supra.
248. See Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 386, 391 A.2d 364, 370 (1978) (quoting United
States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974)); MCCORMICK, supra note 65, § 203
n.32 (citing cases); Evolving Methods, supra note 78, at 685.
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the policy grounds of creating a substantial danger of undue prejudice,
confusing the issues, or misleading the jury,249 or may require that the test,
be proven infallible, or nearly so.210
"Unfair prejudice" in this context means that the trier of fact is liable to
give more weight to the evidence than it actually merits for reasons extrinsic
to its actual probative value. As the court observed with regard to the
admissibility of polygraph evidence in the paradigm case, United States v.
Alexander251:
When polygraph evidence is offered in evidence at trial, it is likely to
be shrouded with an aura of near infallibility, akin to the ancient oracle
of Delphi. . . . Based upon the presentment of this particular form of
scientific evidence, present-day jurors, despite their sophistication and
increased educational levels and intellectual capacities, are still likely to
give significant, if not conclusive, weight to a polygraphist's opinion as
to whether the defendant is being truthful or deceitful in his response to
a question bearing on a dispositive issue in a criminal case. To the
extent that the polygraph results are accepted as unimpeachable or
conclusive by jurors, despite cautionary instructions by the trial judge,
the jurors' traditional responsibility to collectively ascertain the facts
and adjudge guilt or innocence is preempted. 25 2
Psychological expert testimony is analogous to that offered in support of
polygraph evidence, 253 and the policy considerations regarding the admissi-
249. Evolving Methods, supra note 78, at 686. See FED. R. EvID. 403.
250. McCormick notes:
[T]he courts, when undertaking to pass on the question whether the evidence
has sufficient probative value to assist the jury, mix that question with the
one of effect on the jury, and seemingly require that the probative value be as
great as the courts decide the jury will think it to be.
McCORMICK, supra note 65, § 203 n.32. The courts may require that those devices (e.g.,
polygraphs, voice spectrographs, truth serum drugs) or techniques (e.g., mathematical
probabilities) that the courts have concluded the jury will consider infallible be proven
so. Id. Psychological evidence and expert testimony may be considered just as
infallible by juries.
251. 526 F.2d 161 (8th Cir. 1975). See text accompanying notes 113 to 117 supra.
252. Id. at 168 (footnote omitted). See Ennis & Litwack, supra note 12, at 735-38;
cf. United States v. Zeiger, 350 F. Supp. 685, 691 (D.D.C.), rev'd per curiam, 475 F.2d
1280 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (granting of defendant's motion to admit results of polygraph
examination during pretrial evidentiary hearing reversed on appeal even though trial
court concluded that "the feared tendency of the jury to attach exaggerated
significance to the examiner's testimony" could be adequately controlled and
minimized by careful trial procedure).
253. Polygraph evidence at trial typically consists of physical evidence, the
polygram of the subject's physiological responses, and the polygraph examiner's
interpretation of this empirical data. Part of the jury's reliance on polygraph evidence
may be due to the presumption that a machine measuring physiological responses is
necessarily an objective technique, ignoring the highly subjective analysis of that
data by the polygraphist. See Strong, supra note 74, at 13 n.48. Although not directly
analogous to a polygram, psychological test results may be considered by laypersons
to be the product of a wholly objective process, and jurors may ignore the critical
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bility of scientific evidence are applicable to both. Of paramount importance,
according to the Alexander court, is the public's interest in preserving the
defendant's right to the "common sense and collective judgment of his peers,
derived after weighing facts and considering the credibility of witnesses,
which has been the hallmark of the jury tradition. '254 Distinguishing
polygraph evidence from other types of scientific evidence (e.g., ballistics
analysis, fingerprint comparison, handwriting analysis, spectrographic
analysis), the Alexander court noted that the latter are elicited "solely for
the purpose of identifying either an individual or an object allegedly
involved in the perpetration of a criminal act" and added:
These scientific tests do not purport to indicate with any degree of
conclusiveness that the defendant who is so identified or connected with
the object actually committed the crime....
The role of the jury after a polygraphist has testified that the results
of a polygraph examination show that the defendant's denial of
participation in the crime was fabricated is much more circumscribed. If
the expert testimony is believed by the jury, a guilty verdict is usually
mandated. The polygraphist's testimony often is not limited to mere
identification or any other limited aspect of defendant's possible
participation in the criminal act. Through the testimony of the
polygraph expert relating to whether the defendant was being truthful
in his responses concerning participation in the crime, the expert is thus
proffering his opinion based on scientific evidence bearing upon the sole
issue reserved for the jury - is the defendant innocent or guilty? Is this
good or bad? . . . The resolution of this dilemma can await another
day.255
The potential for unfairly prejudicing the jury has been recognized in
several other cases involving the admission of scientific evidence. In United
States v. Amaral,25 6 the accused attempted to introduce the expert testimony
of a psychologist with a doctorate regarding the effect of stress upon
perception and the general unreliability of eyewitness identification.2 57 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the trial court
did not err in excluding such testimony primarily on the grounds that the
effect of stress could be fully appreciated by the jury in light of the other
evidence presented without having that determination put before them in
the context of expert witness testimony. Although the court did not
evaluative element supplied by the psychological expert. Even if psychologists do not
present the trier of fact with such distracting physical evidence, a more subtle form of
prejudice may be involved. It is hypothesized that the aura of scientific objectivity
also encompasses the general techniques and principles underlying psychology and
that this alone may be sufficient to unfairly prejudice the jury "on a dispositive issue
in a criminal case." United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, 168 (8th Cir. 1975).
254. 526 F.2d at 168 (footnote omitted).
255. Id. at 169.
256. 488 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1973).
257. See note 2 supra.
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unequivocally state that the proffered expert testimony would be prejudicial,
it did observe that scientific evidence, in general, may be especially prone to
this risk:
The countervailing considerations most often noted to exclude what
is relevant and material evidence are the risk that admission will. . . 2)
create a substantial danger of undue prejudice or of confusing the issues
or of misleading the jury . . . Scientific or expert testimony particu-
larly courts the second danger because of its aura of special reliability
and trustworthiness.25 8
The Fourth Circuit made a similar observation in United States v. Baller,
259
in which the defendant challenged the admissibility of expert testimony
identifying his voice by means of spectrographic analysis, thereby linking
him to a series of telephone bomb threats. In upholding the admissibility of
such expert testimony, the court of appeals remarked: "There are good
reasons why not every ostensibly scientific technique should be recognized
as the basis for expert testimony. Because of its apparent objectivity, an
opinion that claims a scientific basis is apt to carry undue weight with the
trier of fact.' ' 26 In applying the logical relevancy theory of scientific
evidence, however, the Bailer court did offer the following caveat: "Unless
an exaggerated popular opinion of the accuracy of a particular technique
makes its use prejudicial or likely to mislead the jury, it is better to admit
relevant scientific evidence in the same manner as other expert testimony
.... ,,261 The courts' primary concern is that the jury's dependence upon a
scientific expert's mistaken conclusion will result in a miscarriage of
justice. 262 The role of polygraphic and psychological experts at trial seems
virtually indistinguishable. Although the basic scientific principles involved
may differ, both attempt to present to the trier of fact scientific evidence the
accuracy of which may be unduly exaggerated. 263
258. 488 F.2d at 1152. See United States v. Green, 548 F.2d 1261, 1268 (6th Cir.
1977).
259. 519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 (1975).
260. Id. at 466. The Baller court also added the following requirement:
In order to prevent deception or mistake and to allow the possibility of
effective response, there must be a demonstrable objective procedure for
reaching the opinion and qualified persons who can either duplicate the result
or criticize the means by which it was reached, drawing their own conclusions
from the underlying facts.
Id.
261. Id.
262. E.g., United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, 170 (8th Cir. 1975). See Ennis &
Litwack, supra note 12, 735-38.
263. With regard to the public's tendency to exaggerate the value of psychological
tests, see Flaugher, The Many Definitions of Test Bias, 33 AM. PSYCHOL. 671, 673
(1978). The mere fact that a disease-like label has been assigned to a mental disorder
by a psychologist may prove prejudicial. See Farina, Fisher, Getter & Fischer, Some
Consequences of Changing People's Views Regarding the Nature of Mental Illness, 87
J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 272 (1978).
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The courts' inconsistent treatment of psychological evidence and expert
testimony, in comparison with some other forms of scientific evidence, is an
anomaly. When the scientific evidence is relatively novel, as is polygraph
analysis, the trier of law, as noted above, will subject it to a twofold test.
Even if it fulfills Frye's "general scientific acceptance" standard, it must
also meet a somewhat more objective accuracy requirement. Although
psychology easily satisfies the first criterion, the courts seem to have
skipped the accuracy analysis in the process of making psychology an
indispensable part of certain criminal and civil proceedings. By concentra-
ting on experts' qualifications instead of the evidence they present at trial,
the courts bypass the issue central to their evaluation of other scientific
evidence - the relative accuracy of the techniques involved. In effect, the
court takes judicial notice of psychology, and an evidentiary lacuna
results. 26 4 An opportunity to challenge the underlying basis of psychological
judgments in general, as opposed to those at issue in the particular case,
simply does not arise at trial. Instead, the inquiry is immediately narrowed
to the specific questions of fact, and scrutiny of the scientific underpinnings
of the psychological evidence to be introduced, which would mark the
introduction of polygraph or spectrograph evidence, is thereby obviated. The
courts, under the guise of judicial notice, simply assume that the evidence
derived by psychological methods will meet the logical relevancy threshold
of accuracy greater than chance. The current scientific literature in
psychology and related fields raises serious doubts about the soundness of
such a supposition.
C. The Prejudicial Effect of Generalizing Psychological Expertise
The prejudicial effect of psychological expert testimony may be further
exacerbated by the conflict between rules similar to Federal Rule of
Evidence 704 and the courts' desire to avoid jury dependence upon
psychologists to resolve the issue of ultimate fact. Whether psychologists
should be permitted to offer such opinion testimony depends upon how the
general question of the appropriate limits of expert testimony vis-a-vis the
issue of ultimate fact is decided. 265 A number of state jurisdictions are in
264. See note 108 supra.
265. Criminal statutes frequently require that the accused manifest a particular
state of mind (e.g., willfully, knowingly, recklessly, negligently). E.g., MD. ANN. CODE
art. 27, § 21 (1976) (operation of boat in reckless manner); MD. ANN CODE art. 27, § 156
(Cum. Supp. 1979) (knowingly giving false fire alarms); MD. ANN CODE art. 27, § 388
(1976) (manslaughter by operation of motor vehicle, etc. in grossly negligent manner);
id. § 407 (first degree murder; "wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing"). See
MODEL PENAL CODE PROPOSED OFFICIAL DRAFr § 2.02 (1962). Any science devoted to
the study of human behavior would be material because it may tend to prove the
presence or absence of the requisite mens rea. See United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d
1331, 1351 (9th Cir. 1977). At least one jurisdiction has held that the state of mind of a
criminal defendant is a question of ultimate fact about which psychologists may not
testify as experts unless the defense is based on insanity. Smith v. State, 564 P.2d
1194, 1199-1200 (Wyo. 1977). Contra, United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331, 1351 (9th
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accord with Federal Rule of Evidence 704, which abolishes the ultimate facts
proscription. 66 The rationale for removing this distinction was fourfold: (1)
in practice it was impossible to distinguish between ultimate and non-
ultimate facts; (2) it was difficult for some witnesses to couch their testimony
in anything but ultimate facts; (3) the express rationale for the rule made
little sense, i.e., invasion of the province of the jury; and (4) some courts
attempted to distinguish between testimony on an ultimate fact and
testimony on an issue of law allowing the former but barring the latter,
which proved to be an equally untenable solution.26 7 A suggested rule of
thumb is to consider how a particular witness' testimony will aid the trier of
fact,26s but at least one commentator questions whether an opinion
expressed in terms of some legal standard is ever truly helpful to the jury.269
Another way of characterizing this policy argument against permitting
psychologists to testify in terms of the ultimate issue of fact is that it
Cir. 1977). In Smith, for example, the Wyoming Supreme Court observed that because
the question of guilt or innocence involved legal principles upon which the court
instructs the jury, the psychologist could only express his belief as to how the question
of intent should be decided. Therefore, he would not be applying his special scientific
expertise and would only be going through the same process the jury would follow to
reach his conclusion. Significantly, the court noted that if an insanity defense had
been raised, the state of mind of the accused would have become the proper subject for
expert testimony, 564 P.2d at 1199-1200, implying that the generalization of
psychological expertise to the legal standard is dependent upon how the court
preceives the utility of psychology in the courtroom vis-&-vis the issue of ultimate fact.
For a more thorough discussion of this generalization of expertise phenomenon, see
text accompanying notes 270 to 284 infra.
Ironically, psychiatrists, in the federal courts at least, have been permitted to
offer expert testimony regarding the motives of human conduct when criminal
insanity is not in issue "if it is relevant to negative, or establish, the specific mental
condition that is an element of the crime." United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969,
1002 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en banc). See, e.g., United States v. Bennett, 539 F.2d 45, 53
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 925 (1976). The reason for this anomaly is unclear,
particularly in light of the fact that psychiatrists do not employ the type of
empirically based assessment techniques commonly used by psychologists for
diagnosis. Psychiatric opinions appear to be no less subjective than psychological
opinions and may even be less helpful to the trier of fact. See note 12 supra.
266. E.g., CALIF. EVID. CODE § 805; MINN. CT. R. EVID. 704 (1979); N.J. EVID. R.
56(3); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 907.04 (1975). See 3 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 63,
704[011, at 704-3 to -4 & n.3, 704[02], at 195-97 (Cum. Supp. 1978); Stoebuck,
Opinions on Ultimate Facts: Status, Trends, and a Note of Caution, 41 DEN. L.
CENTER J. 226, 227-36 (1964).
267. 3 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 63, 704[01], at 704-4 to -5.
268. Id. at 704-5.
269. Id. at 704-8 ("Opinions which are expressed in terms of some legal standard
will usually not suffice because they probably do not convey the same information to
jurors as to lawyers."). But cf. Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L. REV. 414, 424
(1952) ("Because jurors realize that they are the final triers to determine the issues
and are reluctant to part with that right, there isn't much danger in reality from the
use of all-embracing questions [i.e., those embracing all the elements of the legal
standard]."). Ladd's assertion that such questions are, at worst, benign remains to be
demonstrated.
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constitutes an unwarranted "generalization of expertise, 270 resulting in
confusion of the expert's scientific expertise for skill in evaluating sucial
policy issues. Consider the following decision-making paradigm:
If conditions A, B, and C exist, then one should do X.
Conditions do exist.
Therefore, one should do X.271
There are two premises. The major one is a prescriptive statement signaled
by the word "should" and might be termed the policy judgment. The minor
premise is a conclusion based upon the application of the empirical
"science" deemed relevant to the inquiry. 272 The resultant observations are
essentially objective and empirically demonstrable. The legal standard
reflects social policy, and whether a party's conduct meets the elements of
that standard is a determination relegated to the trier of fact by our judicial
system. 273 Assuming that the criterion of probative value which ensures
accuracy has been met, the minor premise may be the proper domain of the
scientific expert. The issue is whether psychological experts qua experts can
meaningfully help the trier of fact in its search for truth by generalizing
their expertise in the evaluation of the technical, nonmoral, empirical
premise to the legal standard. Psychological judgments are sufficiently
suspect to warrant greater scrutiny of the minor premise, but even if the
270. The "generalization of expertise" theory was first proposed by Veatch,
Generalization of Expertise, 1 HASTINGS CENTER REP. No. 2, at 29 (1973):
Generalization of expertise arises when, consciously or unconsciously, it
is assumed that an individual with scientific expertise in a particular area
also has expertise in the value judgments necessary to make policy
recommendations simply because he has scientific expertise....
The problem of generalizing expertise is essentially one of confusing
expertise in technical knowledge of a given scientific area with knowledge of
what is morally required in that area.
Id. at 29.
A similar phenonmenon has been observed with regard to psychiatric expert
testimony:
[Psychiatrists have bitten off more than they can chew. The fault, however, is
not theirs alone, for legislatures and courts, in an attempt to shift
responsibility for making the determination of who shall remain free and who
shall be confined, have turned to psychiatry, seeking easy answers where
there are none.
... Subject to constitutional limitations, the decision to deprive another
human of liberty is not a psychiatric judgment but a social judgment. We
shall have to decide how much we value individual freedom; how much we
care about privacy and self-determination; how much deviance we can
tolerate - or how much suffering. There are no "experts" to make those
decisions for us.
Ennis & Litwack, supra note 12, at 752. See Diamond & Louisell, supra note 82,
1342-43; Fleming & Maximov, The Patient or His Victim: The Therapist's Dilemma,
62 CALIF. L. REv. 1025 (1974).
271. Veatch, supra note 270, at 30.
272. See id. at 31.
273. E.g., United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, 168-69 (8th Cir. 1975).
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data gathered by a psychologist about a defendant's behavior and the
resultant diagnosis are reasonably accurate, there is no evidence that
expertise in observing psychological "facts" - the minor premise of the
syllogism - can be directly equated with expertise in the evaluation of
social policy questions - the major premise of the syllogism. 274
Because psychologists are scientists, jurors may consider them to
possess qualities that render them uniquely qualified to decide such
questions or to permit them to make better decisions than laypersons. 275
Juries may also fall prey to a "Barnum"-type effect - vague statements
about a party's personality may be admitted at trial and accepted by the
trier of fact as highly accurate simply because they were offered by a
psychologist, even though such descriptions might be equally true of a broad
segment of the population that would be considered "normal." 276 It is
theorized that when illness language is used to characterize behavior in a
legal context, it reinforces the unproven assumption that the person
described is not responsible for his or her behavior. 277 In summary, there is
little indication that a psychologist's opinion on the issue of ultimate fact
offers the jury much more than the expression of another layperson's
personal opinion and belief as to the applicability of the legal standard.
If "helpfulness" to the trier of fact is the essential criterion for the
admissibility of an opinion regarding the issue of ultimate fact, then a
psychologist's testimony should be excluded. The courts have recognized the
potential prejudicial effect of such generalizations of expertise. In United
274. Veatch, supra note 270, at 31-32. A corollary argument is that while the two
types of expertise are not identical, they are nevertheless correlated. This hypothesis
lends itself to empirical validation, id. at 32: Groups of experts in psychology could be
examined to determine if they uniquely possess the wisdom required to evaluate
whether the applicable legal standard has been met. The hypothesis that ethical
evaluation depends upon familiarity with and sensitivity to the issues that might be
acquired through experience with the issues is subject to an alternative interpretation,
i.e., extensive experience with the same kind of complex problems could inure one to
the personal dimensions of the issue and leave one insensitive to the unique moral
requirements. Id. There is no evidence one way or the other demonstrating a
correlation between expertise in psychology and skill superior to that of the layperson
in assessing the ultimate issue of fact.
275. Two other arguments are frequently offered in support of generalizing
scientific expertise to social policy issues. First, scientists are more rational or able to
reason more logically than the ordinary person. Veatch observes that only rarely do
differences in decision-making result from illogical conclusions drawn from premises.
Id. at 33. He indicates that most differences are accounted for by disagreements about
the major premise or the faulty construction of an argument so that a significant
premise is suppressed. Second, those in a particular profession such as psychology
have special ethical norms that they apply uniquely to their profession. If these
ethical norms were contrary to what a layperson would accept, even as applying to
individuals in the professional role, differences over the major evaluative premise
would arise leading to differences in policy. If anything, this constitutes an argument
against assigning responsibility for such decision-making to members of that
profession. Id. at 34-35.
276. See note 230 supra.
277. Morse, supra note 3, at 553 n.43.
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States v. Brawner,278 the District of Columbia Circuit abandoned the
Durham "product" test 279 for criminal insanity in favor of the American
Law Institute's (ALI) standard.2H° Criticizing the Durham test as relying too
heavily on expert psychiatric and psychological witnesses, the court of
appeals stated:
[T]he difficulty ... is that the medical expert comes, by testimony given
in terms of a non-medical construct ("product"), to express conclusions
that in essence embody ethical and legal conclusions. There is, indeed,
irony in a situation under which the Durham rule, which was adopted in
large part to permit experts to testify in their own terms concerning
matters within their domain which the jury should know, resulted in
testimony by the experts in terms not their own to reflect unexpressed
judgments in a domain that is properly not theirs but the jury's. The
irony is heightened when the jurymen, instructed under the esoteric
"product" standard, are influenced significantly by "product" testimony
of expert witnesses really reflecting ethical and legal judgments rather
than a conclusion within the witnesses' particular expertise. 21
The dichotomy between the psychologist's domain and the jury's is evident.
Chief Judge Bazelon in Brawner also expressed reservations about the
ability of the ALI test to de-emphasize the role of pschological experts in
determinations of legal sanity. 282 This conflict is further exacerbated by the
fact that Federal Rule of Evidence 704 explicitly sanctions expert testimony
that embraces the ultimate issue of fact.28 3 The opposing goals of Brawner
and rule 704 regarding the limitations of psychological expert testimony
278. 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en banc).
279. Under the Durham "product" test, an accused is not criminally responsible if
the unlawful act was the product of mental disease or mental defect. W. LAFAvE & A.
Scorr, supra note 52, § 38, at 286-92.
280. Under the ALI's "substantial capacity" test, a person is not responsible for
criminal conduct if, as a result of mental disease or defect, he lacked substantial
capacity either to appreciate the criminality (wrongfulness) of his conduct or conform
his conduct to the requirements of law. Id. at 292-95.
281. 471 F.2d at 982-83; Schulman, To Be or Not to Be an Expert, 1973 WASH.
U.L.Q. 57; Weihofen, Detruding the Experts, 1973 WASH. U.L.Q. 38. As early as 1954,
the essayist C. S. Lewis foresaw the threat of domination by technical experts under
the therapeutic, or humanitarian, model of punishment. Urging a return to the
traditional retributive theory in the interests of the criminal, he observed: "The
Humanitarian theory .. . removes sentences from the hands of jurists whom the
public conscience is entitled to criticize and places them in the hands of technical
experts whose special sciences do not even employ such categories as rights or
justice." C. S. LEwis, The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment, in GOD IN THE DOCK:
ESSAYS ON THEOLOGY AND ETHICS 289 (W. Hooper ed. 1970).
282. 471 F.2d at 1023-27 (Bazelon, C. J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Cf.
Washington v. United States, 390 F.2d 444, 451-53 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (recognition of the
court's dependence upon experts under the Durham "product" test).
283. See note 8 supra.
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have not gone unnoticed by the courts.284 There is no evidence available that
psychological experts possess greater expertise than jurors in evaluating
whether the legal standard for criminal insanity has been met.
In summary, it is argued that expertise in psychology does not assure
that psychologists can offer a more helpful, or any less subjective, opinion
regarding the issue of ultimate fact than would be drawn by the trier of fact
without such testimony. Consequently, psychological expert testimony
ought to be excluded.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The probative value and admissibility of each level of psychological
testimony is suspect. Although psychological expert witnesses may be
properly qualified in terms of their education and experience, these criteria
do not assure that the scientific underpinnings of such testimony are valid.
Psychological judgments are not as accurate as the courts presume them to
be, and diagnoses based upon a psychologist's observations are, at the very
least, questionable. For reasons that remain obscure, the courts have failed
to apply to psychology the standard used to evaluate the admissibility of
novel types of scientific evidence. Because the courts have tacitly taken
judicial notice of psychology as a bona fide scientific discipline, there is no
opportunity at trial to assail the underlying accuracy of such judgments in
terms of their reliability and validity.
284. E.g., Suggs v. LaVallee, 570 F.2d 1092, 1115 n.58 (2d Cir. 1978); see United
States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, 169 (8th Cir. 1975); cf. United States v. Milne, 487
F.2d 1232, 1235 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1123 (1975) (concerning
admissibility of lay testimony to establish insanity, court concluded: "We must, of
course, recognize that opinions as to sanity or insanity are distinct from opinions as
to criminal capacity. Criminal capacity is a legal conclusion and even an expert,
medical or legal, may not speak so as to employ a legal definition." (footnote
omitted)).
The American Psychological Association's Task Force on the Role of
Psychology in the Criminal Justice System has reached a similar conclusion. In its
recent report, it states: "Since it is not within the professional competence of
psychologists to offer conclusions on matters of law, psychologists should resist
pressure to offer such conclusions." Task Force on the Role of Psychology in the
Criminal Justice System, American Psychological Association, Report on the Task
Force on the Role of Psychology in the Criminal Justice System, 33 AM. PSYCHOL.
1099, 1105 (1978) (Recommendation 5) (emphasis omitted) [hereinafter cited as Task
Force Report]. The task force astutely noted that often the courts must share the
blame because they pressure psychologists to answer legal questions for them "in an
attempt to evade their responsibility to deal with difficult issues." Id. at 1106. See also
TASK FORCE ON CLINICAL ASPECTS OF THE VIOLENT INDIVIDUAL, AMERICAN
PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, CLINICAL ASPECTS OF THE VIOLENT INDIVIDUAL: TASK
FORCE REPORT No. 8, at 33 (1974) ("It has been noted that 'dangerousness' is neither a
psychiatric nor a medical diagnosis, but involves issues of legal judgment and
definition, as well as issues of social policy. Psychiatric expertise in the prediction of
'dangerousness' is not established and clinicians should avoid 'conclusory' judgments
in this regard.").
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Psychological expert testimony should be excluded or at least severely
curtailed for two reasons. 28 5 First, psychological diagnoses may not be
reasonably accurate - accuracy greater than chance - and, consequently,
cannot meet the prima facie showing of logical relevancy. Those judgments
that are reasonably accurate should be admitted subject to the usual course
of rigorous cross-examination. Second, even if psychological diagnoses are
reasonably accurate, psychological expert testimony should be excluded
because such evidence cannot meet the higher standard of accuracy required
by the courts in light of the evidentiary counterweights, and the jury is
likely to exaggerate its significance given its aura of scientific objectivity.
Psychological opinion testimony regarding the causal connection between a
mental disorder and criminal or tortious conduct - the issue of ultimate fact
- should be excluded on similar grounds, at least until it can be
satisfactorily demonstrated that psychologists possess special expertise in
evaluating the relationship between the scientific "fact" of mental disorder
and the applicable legal standard. The test should be whether such an
opinion would be more helpful to the trier of fact than the thoughtful opinion
of the average layperson.
These conclusions lead to the following recommendations, which are
designed to place psychological evidence and expert testimony in its proper
evidentiary perspective in light of the admissibility of other types of
scientific evidence:
First, the courts should permit the introduction of evidence challenging
the scientific accuracy of psychological techniques and diagnoses before
taking judicial notice, tacit or otherwise, of psychology as a scientific
discipline.
Second, if such psychological evidence is deemed prima facie admissible
given its reliability and validity, courts should then weigh its probative
value against the countervailing factors. In practice, the application of this
second recommendation would probably result in the exclusion of all but the
most accurate psychological evidence and the expert testimony based
thereon. 2 6
285. These arguments also apply to psychiatric evidence and expert testimony.
Because the dogmatic medical-nonmedical distinction makes little evidentiary sense,
see note 52 supra, there is no sound reason why psychiatric evidence and expert
testimony should be preferred to that offered by psychologists - both are equally
suspect. See generally J. ZISKIN, supra note 12; Ennis & Litwack, supra note 12. If the
courts continue to accept psychiatric evidence and expert testimony without first
assessing their scientific accuracy, psychologists should be accorded parity with
psychiatrists.
286. Neither of these first two recommendations is intended to interfere with the
psychologist's important role as a highly skilled observer of human behavior.
Psychologists, like any other witnesses with firsthand knowledge, should be permitted
to explain without jargon, see Morse, supra note 3, at 611, what they have observed
about the behavior of the person in question. They may be particularly adept at
noting disordered behaviors not apparent to the ordinary layperson, id. at 611-12;
however, their testimony should be limited to those behaviors that can be empirically
demonstrated to be indicators or predictors of a mental disorder, id. at 619-22. See
1979]
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Third, opinions by psychologists regarding the relationship between a
mental disorder and the issue of ultimate fact should be excluded unless the
courts affirmatively find them more helpful than not to the trier of fact.
Such opinions should be something more than just the expression of another
layperson's belief about how the case should be resolved and should draw
upon the psychological expert's particular skills as a 'scientist without
generalizing that expertise to the issue of ultimate fact. The courts should
resist the temptation to translate difficult social and moral judgments about
mentally disordered persons into questions requiring scientific expertise. 28 7
Because assertions of special expertise in matters of social policy may be
empirically demonstrated, psychologists should not be permitted to
generalize their expertise until evidence of their special qualifications as
social policymakers is available. Conclusions about the issue of ultimate fact
in this context should remain the province of the jury.
The reader cannot accept these conclusions without also considering the
logical consequences of the position taken in this Comment. Although the
issues raised are beyond its scope, the implications are twofold. First, if
there are no psychological experts in the courtroom, then licensure, which
usually is an indicator of special skill beyond what a layperson would be
expected to possess, may be unwarranted. If the basis of psychology as a
scientific discipline is questionable, then the prerequisites for licensure -
education and experience - cannot create ex nihilo a field of psychological
expertise. This result, however, does not necessarily follow. In the context of
the psychologist's role in the courtroom, a different, and perhaps more
stringent, standard of accuracy must be applied to psychologists than the
one imposed by the legislature for the protection of the general public.
Through licensure statutes, the states may be satisfied with psychologists
whose skills are reasonably accurate, whereas the courts must carry the
evaluation of psychological evidence and expert testimony one step further
and determine whether its probative value to the trier of fact is outweighed
by the various countervailing factors. Thus, the threshold of accuracy or
skill required by the courts may exceed that required by the legislature for
licensure. Therefore, the exclusion of psychological expert testimony from
the courtroom does not necessarily imply that psychological "experts"
cannot or do not exist in other contexts.
The second consequence of this analysis is that without psychological,
and by implication psychiatric, expertise, the existence of the insanity
Task Force Report, supra note 284, at 1106 (Recommendation 6). Based upon the
testimony of lay witnesses such as family, friends, and co-workers, and firsthand
courtroom observations, jurors frequently will be able to decide for themselves
whether there is a sufficient causal connection between the alleged disordered
behavior and the issue of ultimate fact without the assistance of psychological
experts. See Morse, supra note 3, at 554-60, 616. It has also been argued that
psychological experts may be especially skilled at detecting malingering. This ability,
however, has not been empirically demonstrated. Id. at 613-14. See text accompany-
ing note 239 supra.
287. See note 284 supra. See generally Morse, supra note 3.
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defense is jeopardized. If there are no experts in the field of mental disorders
and their relationship to criminal conduct, then the ultimate arbiter of the
existence of mental conditions that will exculpate criminal conduct is the
trier of fact. If it is without a sound scientific basis, the insanity defense
must be reevaluated and perhaps eliminated altogether. Exploration of these
two complex issues, however, must await future articles.
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